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ABSTRACT
This case study is in an effort to demonstrate the disastrous effects of
modernization via social mobilization and economic development when initiated from
above and through foreign intrusion.

Initially, this research will examine previous

theoretical literature regarding the political phenomenon of modernization and social
mobilization. My primary focus will center on the problems that occur when rapid
modernization, based on an exogenous model, is forced onto a traditional society by
elites and social mobilization outpaces political institutionalization. My case study will
focus on the country of Iran, as the political and societal factors of interest seem to be
highly illustrative of the period leading up to the revolution. A brief historical analysis
will be conducted. I will then analyze Iran from 1953 to 1979 by looking at the policies
of the shah and the Western influence of those policies, the evidence of social
mobilization that may have taken place, any moves towards urbanization, possible affects
on traditional groups, and the state of political institutionalization. This study’s central
argument is that rapid modernization through social mobilization while lacking political
institutionalization results in instability and possibly revolution. This study is being
conducted in an effort to demonstrate the validity of this proposed political phenomenon
by analyzing Iran in the years leading-up to the revolution.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II and the victory of the Allied Powers,
westernization began to permeate many traditional societies. As a result of the spread of
westernization, many traditional countries began to modernize.

In general, Western

societies began to have a greater impact on economic, political, and social development
in many of these developing states. The West believed that if heavy influence was placed
on developing countries it would result in them becoming more like “us.” During the
Cold War, the United States attempted to gain and maintain as many allies as possible in
an effort to move towards global free trade and U.S. hegemony. The West needed a
paradigm to accomplish these goals and counter the Soviet Union‟s Marxist framework.
The West felt they could accomplish all of these things with the use of modernization
theory.

Modernization theory presupposes that all countries modernize in similar

fashion.
At the time, it was the belief of many Western oriented theorists that traditional
countries could develop in a similar fashion to that of Western countries.
“Theories of modernization assumed the evolution of capitalist
development along a linear path toward modernization. The idea of
modernization seems to have originated in the nineteenth-century belief
that the Western world would civilize other backward areas by spreading
Western values, capital, and technology. Underdeveloped areas would
evolve into developed, modern nations along paths charted in the West”
(Chilcote and Johnson 1983, 9).
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If true, these countries would become more Westernized and likely allies of the West.
During the Cold War era, the United States engendered developing countries to Western
ideals rather than risking their fall to the threat of the Soviet Union‟s communist
ideology.
“For modernization theory there were two forms of developmental
pathology: degenerative backwardness, on the one hand, and cancerous
communism, on the other. In contrast to both these, modernization theory
defined healthy modernity as a fully realized New Deal America: a godfearing but secular society in which race and gender were of little import;
a privately run, full-employment economy of well-paid workers, all of
whom owned a house and a car; a formal democratic system in which
widespread agreement existed about societal goals, the details of which
would be worked out by technically trained public service elites.
Modernization theory was thus the foreign policy analogue to “social
modernism” at home, namely the idea that a meliorist, rationalizing,
benevolent, technocratic state was capable of solving all social and
especially economic ills” (Gilman 2003b, 56).
Lenin‟s Soviet superpower, however, gave developing postcolonial countries an
appealing alternative to the West that did not contain the histories of the subjugation that
colonialism contained. During the Cold War, any realistic American policy toward
developing areas of the world must “treat explicitly the problem of communism” (Pye
1957, 73).

Many political theorists and policymakers in the U.S. believed that

modernization would allow decolonizing, developing states to adopt Western values and
stop the spread of communism. “By defining a singular path of progressive change, the
concept of modernization simplified the complicated world-historical problems of
decolonization and industrialization, helping to guide American economic aid and
military intervention in postcolonial regions” (Gilman 2003a, 3).

Western style

development based on modernization theory became the West‟s ideological equivalent
and alternative to communism.
2

“Modernization theorists and Leninists believed that the relevant unit of
economic and political analysis was the individual nation-state. And both
also believed that this process was “revolutionary,” irreversible, and most
important, salutary. They also both believed that modernization was an
inexorable process, but one which could be accelerated by the right kinds
of leaders. Both believed a single modernity would eventually emerge as
well. Even if they differed sharply in the political details of that vision,
modernization theory and Leninism both believed that technology and
industrial civilization had features that transcended their political contexts;
assembly lines and factories were the world‟s destiny, both sides agreed”
(Gilman 2003b, 49-50).

As a result of this shared view, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to
gain as much control as possible regarding the world‟s natural resources in an effort to
continue to grow their respective industrialized nations. Oil was chief among these
natural resources. In addition, both the U.S. and Soviet Union believed that gaining a
geopolitical foothold in the region would result in an advantage over the other.
Due to the United States interest in oil and the strategic importance of the region,
there was a particular importance in preventing Soviet control of the Eurasian land mass.
In the case of Iran, during the Cold War the U.S. gave billions of dollars in aid and
allowed an almost unlimited access to arms purchases. The shah‟s access to this aid and
military armament allowed for an unnatural economic and political development. This
thesis will study modernization using Iran as a potential example of how Western
oriented indigenous leaders coupled with foreign culture can often have a negative effect
on traditional societies.
The case of Iran would not be an isolated one.

Many developing agrarian

societies have made an effort to control their development process without interference
from state government or foreign intrusion.
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These types of issues involving

modernization are often found in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and in parts of
Asia.
“One of the main reasons why postwar development has so often produced
disappointing results in developing countries is that it has attempted, for
the most part, to replicate the West, rather than promote processes of
indigenous change within the Third World itself. Inevitably, efforts to
replace the traditional values, relationships and institutions of Third World
societies with alien Western ones have created rising tensions,
uncertainties and feelings of anomie” (Brohman 1995, 129).
Conversely, modernization theorists generally viewed traditional society as an obstacle to
economic growth through modernization. Modernization theorists also understood that
modernizing, particularly at a rapid pace, would likely cause violence in changing
traditional societies, yet it would be worth the cost. This conflict that many traditional
societies face regarding modernization continues today.
The problem of modernization is further exacerbated when leaders offer no outlet
for traditional groups being impacted to take part in the modernization process. It is
equally problematic when the newly created modernized economic class is also barred
from political participation. Therefore, if present, this thesis will also look at the effects
of creating a modern, urban, and educated middle class without allowing for any sector of
the citizenry to articulate political interests and views.
This study may prove important in understanding why political instability occurs
and certain groups in a population ultimately decide to revolt. “One of the fundamental
preconditions for revolution…is not so much the poverty of peasants (or workers), but
economic change that threatens the relative security and traditional status of men and
women living according to norms and habits that are rapidly becoming anachronistic”
(Greene 1990, 164). In better understanding these economic changes that threaten the
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cultural underpinnings of traditional societies, it remains to be seen whether the West can
play a constructive role in their self-paced development. Ideally, a better understanding
of the conditions that led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 would in turn aid subsequent
Western policy makers in an attempt to avoid another Islamic Republic or at a minimum
gain a better understanding of the political phenomenon that caused it.
Modernization theory holds that attempts at rapid economic, social, and cultural
changes of a state must be accompanied by political development. Regarding the process
of modernization, Samuel Huntington states that in large part it involves the
“multiplication and diversification of social forces in society” (Huntington 1968, 89).
The impact on traditional groups, having for centuries changed at a slow and deliberate
pace, suddenly faced with rapid modernization are tremendous. Daniel Lerner states the
following regarding the modernization process on a society;
“We know that urbanization, industrialization, secularization,
democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard
and unrelated fashion even though we often are obliged to study them
singly. Our multiple correlations showed them to be so highly associated
as to raise the question whether some are genuinely independent factors at
all – suggesting that perhaps they went together so regularly because, in
some historical sense, they had to go together” (Lerner 1958, 438).
It is no simple task for a traditional society to undergo this conglomerate of economic,
social, and cultural changes without serious difficulties.
The ability of a society to cope with rapid modernization is further exacerbated
when there is a lack of new institutions for political redress. Samuel Huntington states
that, “rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled
with the slow development of political institutions are responsible for violence and
instability” (Huntington 1968, 4). Political instability is derived from the failure to
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address the issue of equality of political participation coupled with the much more rapidly
growing art of modernizing societies to associate together (Huntington 1968, 5). In Iran,
it is believed that a divide between the newly created urban economic classes and the old
agrarian peasants and middle class merchants occurred as a result of rapid modernization
through social mobilization.
The two key aspects of modernization are economic development and social
mobilization. For purposes of this study, Karl Deutsch‟s definition of social mobilization
will be adopted. Deutsch defines social mobilization as, “the process in which major
clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken
and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior” (Deutsch
1961, 494). Scholar Samuel Huntington states that social mobilization, among other
factors, is the result of literacy, education, and urbanization (Huntington 1968, 33).
Economic development involves the complete economic activity and output of a society
(Huntington 1968, 33-34). Social mobilization comprises changes in the aspirations of
individuals, groups, and societies; economic development comprises changes in their
capabilities – modernization requires both (Huntington 1968, 34).
Social mobilization and economic development through modernization will be
analyzed and measured through the use of primary sources, such as newspaper articles
that document the policies of the government, Western influences, and the societal
changes that were taking place in Iran.
The crux of this study‟s argument is that rapid modernization generated as a result
of state enacted social mobilization and economic development coupled with the
suppression of political participation will result in political instability.
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The second chapter of this study will provide an examination of some of the most
comprehensive theoretical literature that addresses development and more specifically,
modernization theory. This study will utilize the arguments put forth by comparative
political analysts such as Samuel Huntington, Edward Shils, David Apter, Nils Gilman,
and Osvaldo Sunkel.
The third chapter of this study will give a brief historical review of Iran‟s
traditional history and its initial brushes with modernization. The chapter will touch on
four key historical phases, including the Reuter Concession (1872-1873), the Tobacco
Revolt (1894), the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911), and the modernization efforts
made by Reza Shah (1926-1941) until his exile. This historical review is in an effort to
add context and provide a contrast with the initial contact that Iran had with respect to
modernization and the suspected period of accelerated modernization that potentially
began in 1953.

Modernization theorist Daniel Lerner, who wrote The Passing of

Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (1958), a scholarly work that involved
nearly a decade of research, stated that a modernization process was barely visible in
1950 to 1951 Iran (Lerner 1958, 401). Yet, by 1954 Daniel Learner stated that Iran
seemed to falter at rapid modernization (Learner 1958, viii). Therefore, it would seem
that the period after the coup of 1953 would be the beginning point of rapid
modernization in Iran. This chapter should provide a foundation that will aid in a more
complete understanding regarding the extent to which the suspected, subsequent period of
rapid modernization was somewhat foreign and certainly controversial to the traditional
culture of Iran as well.
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Chapter four will begin with Mohammed Reza Shah‟s reign following his father‟s
exile. The chapter will analyze the 1953 British Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6)
and United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led coup that ousted the charismatic
nationalist Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, due to his nationalization of
Iranian oil. The coup replaced Mossadegh as the prime minister with General Fazlollah
Zahedi and returned the fleeing shah to power. It is expected this study will show that the
U.S. and Britain had growing concerns over the economic and political direction of the
Mossadegh government. Specifically, due to Mossadegh‟s favoring of nationalization, it
was feared that he would form an alliance with the Tudeh Party and as a result favor
relations with the Soviet Union over the United States. Zahedi on the other hand was
more pro-Western and supportive of Western style modernization. The successful coup
in 1953 is a perfect starting point to this study as it marks the rise of Mohammed Reza
Shah and the suspected beginning of Iranian dependence on the United States. This is
also the potential beginning of U.S. supported Western oriented modernization efforts by
the shah.
Chapter four will also analyze the effects of any increased rates of Western
modernization in Iran, specifically regarding the shah‟s “White Revolution” reform.
Also examined in this section will be the relationship and any potential influence the
West, particularly the United States, had on Iran‟s possible rapid modernization. More
precisely, it will examine Iranian revenues generated by the oil boom and any U.S. aid
that Iran may have relied upon to fund any modernizing efforts. Modernization of the
military and the state bureaucracy in particular will be analyzed.
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This study will then look at possible urbanization, any negative effect on
traditional groups such as the bazaar merchants, the ulama, peasants, and agrarian society
in Iran, and any evidence of social mobilization that may have taken place. Evidence of a
duel society that may have developed due to potential rapid modernization through social
mobilization and any linkage to the economic policies of the shah over the previous two
decades will be analyzed as well. Logically, this duel society could potentially have
consisted of the landed upper class, traditional middle class, and peasants on one side and
a newly created urban middle class on the other.
This chapter will also analyze the important role the level of political
institutionalization and participation may have played. Samuel Huntington states that the
level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by its “adaptability,
complexity, autonomy, and coherence” (Huntington 1968, 12).

By identifying and

examining these criteria, Iran‟s level of institutionalization can be determined. Increased
modernization generally results in higher education levels, which in turn lead to increased
interest in political participation. Initial indications suggest the shah‟s response to this
interest was to suppress the opposition. In addition, the shah seemingly disallowed any
change oriented institutions for interest articulation such as an effective parliamentary
branch, the creation of unions, or to legalize the formation of political organizations. It is
expected that the evidence will demonstrate a policy of suppression by the shah‟s regime
regarding the desires of greater political participation by many Iranians.
Chapter four will close by examining the political instability that ensued. It is
expected that the evidence will demonstrate that the shah‟s rapid modernizing policies,
urbanization, social mobilization, and finally lack of political participation and

9

institutionalization led to this instability.

One of the seemingly useful aspects of

modernization theory is its understanding that without political participation violence
may ensue. When the economy went into rapid decline in the mid-1970s the citizenry
would have laid sole blame on the shah, as there was seemingly no one else to blame.
Chapter five will reflect upon the policies of the shah, the foreign policy decisions
of the United States that may have potentially led to the revolution in Iran, lessons
learned, and potential future policies. While this study will reveal some of the severe
shortcomings of modernization theory, this study will not advocate for the tenets of
dependency theory either. “While dependency theory has questioned old and static
formulations, it has not provided concrete or consistent guidelines to transforming
society” (Chilcote and Johnson 1983, 27).

There is no unified grand theory of

development that has risen from the theoretical debate between modernization and
dependency theory. This is most likely due to the fact that “it has become increasingly
evident that development may follow many diverse paths that lie beyond the experience
of the advanced industrial countries” (Brohman 1995, 132).
This study will conclude by attempting to outline some of the lessons learned in
an effort to avoid another Islamic Republic in the Middle East or an equally radical
regime type. By looking at the lessons learned in Iran, it is expected that this study will
show that policies of rapid modernization have ignored the intrinsic role of culture in the
transition to modernity.

This study will also utilize a portion of Osvaldo Sunkel‟s

economic development strategy that calls for independent efforts to achieve selfsustained development, from within.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
The method used to analyze modernization theory and its effects is that of the
case study method. Researcher Harry Eckstein equates case studies to that of clinical
studies in medicine (Eckstein 1975, 81). Eckstein defines case studies as the study of
individuals, both personal and collective (Eckstein 1975, 83). Eckstein argues that case
studies have been applied to a physical person instead of properly applying it as a
measure (Eckstein 1975, 132). For Eckstein, singular observations can be applied to all
phases of theory building and particularly to case studies (Eckstein 1975, 132). This
research concerning the rapid modernization of Iran will be in an effort to study rapid
modernization as a collective measure to be applied to other developing countries facing
similar obstacles.

John Gerring, another researcher in the field of political science

weighed in on case studies, defining them as the intensive study of a single unit with a
goal of generalizing across a bigger set of units (Gerring 2004, 341). This is exactly what
this research will attempt to do.
The process of modernization is intimately linked to the study of comparative
politics as the “study of change involves the comparison of similarities and differences
through time” and “comparative politics involves the analysis of similarities and
differences through space” (Huntington 1971, 285). Modernization as an idea may have
begun with “the growth of lending and fiscal devices, the need to support modern armies,
the application of technologies in competitive market situations, and the influences of
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trade and voyages on the scientific spirit – all of which are evidence that modernity in the
West attacked religion and superstition, family, and church, mercantilism, and autocracy”
(Apter 1987, 89).

Modernization as a theory largely began in 1893 when French

sociologist, Emile Durkheim, articulated the idea of social development though stages in
The Division of Labor in Society (1893). Later, this idea was expounded upon by
American political scholar W.W. Rostow in The Economic Stages: A Non-Communist
Manifesto (1960). Rostow articulated five stages of economic growth; the traditional
society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of
mass-consumption (Rostow 1971, 4-11). Though their stages of development differ, both
Durkheim and Rostow believed that all countries reach modernization in the same
manner. This basic principle is the cornerstone of modernization theory.
Modernization theory is a conservative theoretical perspective in the field of
comparative politics. As dependency theorist Ronald Chilcote states, “Modernization
reflected the conservative intellectual tradition” (Chilcote and Johnson 1983, 10).
Modernization theory‟s basic principle that all nations modernize in similar fashion is
certainly a West-centric approach, rooted in an Anglo-American ideal. United States
foreign policy was based on this false premise during much of the Cold War period. This
caused many unnecessary missteps along the way to the eventual winning of the Cold
War. “Modernization theory represents the most explicit and systemic blueprint ever
created by Americans for reshaping foreign societies” (Gilman 2003a, 5). Modernization
theory was a disastrous American foreign policy paradigm while in use during the Cold
War; one that caused the United States to replace former European colonial powers as a
source of exploitation and intrusion.
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As stated, modernization theory went into practice and was at the height of
popularity during the Cold War era. During this era “the theory of modernization was
embraced by political scientists, and comparative politics was looked at in the context of
modernization” (Huntington 1971, 285). Consequently, the most prolific scholars of
modernization theory derive from this period. The five theorists that will be utilized for
the benefit of this case study are Samuel Huntington, Edward Shils, David Apter, Nils
Gilman, and Osvaldo Sunkel.
Comparative political scientist Samuel Huntington, David Apter, and sociologist
Edward Shils are three of the most influential scholars regarding the analysis of
modernization theory. All three conducted much of their research and published much of
their most celebrated works during the decades of the Cold War. Huntington, perhaps
better than any scholar, has rigorously analyzed the political phenomenon of social
mobilization and economic development. Shils, more so than any other scholar, has
analyzed the elements of tradition and what exactly it encompasses. David Apter offers a
more eclectic approach by selecting ingredients from both liberal modernization and
radical dependency theory to overcome the limitations of each, thereby forming a
superior framework for contemporary analysis. Nils Gilman is a more recent voice on
modernization theory, having conducted much of his research during the post-Cold War
era. The work of economist Osvaldo Sunkel will offer an economic way forward for
developing countries through an autonomous capitalist solution.
Each theorist offers a unique perspective of modernization theory, which taken
together offers a more complete understanding of the approach. This will in turn allow
for the most exhaustive understanding of the political phenomenon that took place in Iran
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during the years leading-up to the revolution and why United States and Iranian
governmental over reliance on modernization theory so handily accounts for the events
that occurred.
Modernization theory was chosen over other theories because initial research
seems to indicate that this popular paradigm of the time more readily accounts for the
changes in Iran in the decades leading-up to the revolution. Alternative theories such as
Marxist theory cannot be taken seriously in accounting for the events preceding the
revolution since the Communist Party in Iran, the Tudeh Party, had no effective
organizational cohesiveness within the country during the years leading up to the
revolution. In addition, they did not benefit or hold any power in the post-revolutionary
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Systems theory also fails to account for the revolutionary events that transpired in
Iran. This theory dictates that revolution occurs when existing social structures fail to
conduct their essential functions. The problem with this theory in relation to Iran is that
the existing social structure continued to perform as it always had, which it seems in
many cases is to never have performed at all. More specifically, social structures that
would allow for interest articulation through political participation seem to have never
been offered to the modernizing society in Iran.
Lastly, the revolutionary theory of frustration-aggression holds that aggressive
behavior results from feelings of frustration.

Revolution can occur when levels of

individual frustration morph into aggregate aggression against the state (Greene 1990,
192). As opposed to Marxist theory and systems theory, aggression-frustration theory did
seem to play a role in the revolution in Iran. “This hypothesis is based on the supposition
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that economic development increases people‟s expectation and its reversal generates
deprivation and unfulfilled expectations, which can lead to collective violence” (Milani
1994, 16).

This would have occurred after rapid modernization and economic

development raised expectations greatly and was met with a sharp decline, which led to
what James C. Davies calls his J-curve or gap hypothesis. Here is how the J-curve theory
works;
“Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of
objective economic and social development is followed by a short period
of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with
great effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary” (Davies
1962, 5).
While James C. Davies J-curve and frustration-aggression theory seemingly demonstrate
causality when analyzing the revolution in Iran, it would be subsequent to any potential
rapid modernization and economic development that took place.
“Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional
man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of
satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers
of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants.
The ability of a traditional society to satisfy these new aspirations,
however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves”
(Huntington 1968, 53-54).
The paradigm of modernization theory, therefore, would potentially be the driving force
that led to the revolution and hence will be the subject of this study. Only modernization
theory truly offers a conceptual paradigm that coincides with the political phenomena that
seemingly occurred prior to the revolution.
Samuel Huntington
Scholar Samuel Huntington presents one of the most in depth and fascinating
views of modernization theory offered to date. The following works by Huntington will
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be utilized for this study; Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), The Change to
Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics (1971), and No Easy Choice:
Political Participation in Developing Countries (1976). Huntington offers modernization
theory as a multifaceted process that involves changes in all areas of human thought and
activity in a developing society.
“At the psychological level, modernization involves a fundamental shift in
values, attitudes, and expectations.
At the intellectual level,
modernization involves the tremendous expansion of man‟s knowledge
about his environment and the diffusion of this knowledge throughout
society through increased literacy, mass communication, and education.
Demographically, modernization means changes in the patterns of life, a
marked increase in health and life expectancy, increased occupational,
vertical, and geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of
urban population as contrasted with rural. Socially, modernization tends
to supplement the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles
with consciously organized secondary associations having much more
specific functions” (Huntington 1968, 32-33).
American foreign policy did not respect or fully understand the complexities and possible
complications of pursuing a policy of modernization of developing countries.

The

prevailing assumption of American policy in the 1950s was that economic assistance
promotes economic development, economic development promotes economic stability,
and progress on economic development will led to progress on political stability
(Huntington 1968, 6). This study, coupled with Huntington‟s well-articulated analysis
regarding modernization theory, will demonstrate how inaccurate and wrongheaded this
policy was.
Ironically, the American policy from the late 1950s and 1960s was based largely
on modernization theory as it was espoused at the time.

It was “rooted in the

fundamental contrast between “traditional” and “modern” societies, modernization theory
posited the existence of a common and essential pattern of “development,” defined by
16

progress in technology, military, and bureaucratic institutions, and the political and social
structure” (Gilman 2003a, 3). “By defining a singular path of progressive change, the
concept of modernization simplified the complicated world-historical problems of
decolonization and industrialization, helping to guide American economic aid and
military intervention in postcolonial regions” (Gilman 2003a, 3). It is expected that the
primary case study for this research will demonstrate this singular path to development
by Iran and the United States intrusive role regarding this policy. This policy seems to
have led to many foreign policy mistakes by the U.S. during the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations.
Samuel Huntington fully understood the role that culture represented in the
process of societal development. Unlike previous modernization theorists, Huntington
rejected the attempts by Western society to change the postcolonial world and he rejected
the idea that modernization was a progressive impetus. “Modernization thus tends to
produce alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and
new” (Huntington 1968, 3).

This was the ideological basis on which many

modernization theorists advocated for United States intervention during the 1950s and
1960s. From the 1950s through the 1960s, modernization theory dominated American
social scientific thought regarding economic, political, and social change in the
postcolonial world (Gilman 2003a, 3).
Huntington also makes the distinction between early modernizers such as the
European and North American regions where modernization was spread out over several
centuries and non-Western regions where issues of centralization of authority, national
integration, social mobilization, economic development, political participation, and social
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welfare have arisen simultaneously (Huntington 1968, 46). Therefore, it is not modernity
that constitutes instability it is instead the path that leads to it. As Huntington argues,
rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with
the slow development of political institutions are responsible for violence and instability
(Huntington 1968, 4). Modernization theory therefore has led developing countries to
modernize at an unnatural pace, leading to more societal detriment than positive
development.
Rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups with an expanded
social consciousness naturally calls for increased opportunities for political participation.
“The principle difference between traditional and modern societies is the
scope, intensity, and bases of political participation. Socio-economic
modernity and political participation seem to march hand-in-hand through
history. The higher the level of socio-economic development in a society,
the higher the level of political participation” (Huntington and Nelson
1976, 43).
According to Huntington, if the development of political institutions lags too far behind
social and economic change, instability will result. “Political instability derives precisely
from the failure to meet this condition: equality of political participation is growing much
more rapidly than the art of associating together” (Huntington 1968, 5).

Social

mobilization often forces increased urbanization through an exodus from the agrarian
areas. These traditional agrarian groups, now forced to interact with urban groups, often
become frustrated and can lead to violence. “The most fundamental aspect of political
modernization consequently, is the participation in politics beyond the village or town
level by social groups throughout the society and the development of new political
institutions, such as political parties, to organize that participation” (Huntington 1968,
36). Dislocating culturally traditional groups in an attempt to modernize through social
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mobilization, coupled with a failure to provide political participation, can lead to feelings
of alienation and frustration. This frustration can often lead to violence.
As a remedy to this phenomenon, Huntington believed that more of an emphasis
should be placed on stability when rapid social and economic changes accompany
modernization.
“The most important political distinction among countries concerns not
their form of government but their degree of government. The differences
between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between
those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community,
legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries
whose politics is deficient in these qualities” (Huntington 1968, 1).
Huntington‟s theory favors stability and order, as he sees this as an essential element to
all political systems. Huntington further states that “a government with a low level of
institutionalization is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government”
(Huntington 1968, 28). In this context, the Iranian government of the shah was a bad
government.
Edward Shils
Edward Shils is another scholar of modernization theory that understands and
respects the role of culture and self-paced modernization by traditional societies. Shils‟
most well-known work regarding culture and modernization theory, Tradition (1981),
articulates why culture should be revisited by many social scientists. Shils believes that
too much of an emphasis is placed on change and Western views of improvement, not in
maintaining institutions that have been erected.
“The appreciation of past accomplishments and of beliefs inherited from
the past as guides to conduct has been more widely observed in many
societies of the past than it has been in Western societies in the last two
centuries. In law, literature, politics, and religion there was – unevenly –
more than there is at present a belief that past conduct, past practices, past
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beliefs had evidence on their side. Whether because of revelation or
genius or experience or reverence for ancestors and for no reason other
than the fact that such things already existed and “worked,” human beings
were often knowingly respectful towards the things which they had
inherited from the past and they guided their behavior accordingly” (Shils
1981, 20).
Founders are praised, innovators are praised, maintaining what innovators create however
is not (Shils 1981, 2). This cognitive viewpoint of many societies, mainly Western, is an
important perspective when looking at the goals of modernization.
In stark contrast, traditional societies are often guided morally by religious
leaders. Religious leaders also act as teachers to many in traditional societies. Much of
the society works in the agricultural field passing down their agrarian knowledge from
one generation to the next.
“If the schools become separated from religion and family and work
against them, traditions will not be transmitted; they will become very
attenuated. The tradition seeking capacities will be left without the
framework which they need. They will be like vines unwatered and
untrimmed and without a trellis on which to attach themselves” (Shils
1981, 315).
Traditional societies are thus intertwined. By analyzing indigenous societies in this
manner, one can better see how rapid modernization would severely disrupt their long
held beliefs and practices. “Modern technology, in its wide utilization, has brought about
so many changes in the organization of labor, in the distribution of the population, and in
the standard of living, so many new pleasures and new problems, that it seems utterly
alien to anything traditional” (Shils 1981, 82). This is precisely why rapid modernization
can produce such a strong negative reaction from a traditional populace engaged in
traditional practices dating back generations.
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Shils directly addresses the issue of how long a pattern, belief, or practice must be
transmitted and received for it to be regarded as a tradition. Shils states that a tradition in
the sense of an “enduring entity” must last over three generations to become a tradition
(Shils 1981, 15). Obviously, the practice of the Muslim religion is a long standing
tradition in Iran. As it stands, monotheism is currently between two and a half and three
millennia in duration (Shils 1981, 16). In Iran, Shi‟a Islam has been the state religion
since the year 1501. Traditions in effect for this duration are not easily or quickly
changed. Though they are not easily changed, substantive traditions are less prominent
than they once were. “Substantive traditions continue, however, not because they are the
exterior manifestation of still unbroken habits and superstitions but because most human
beings constituted as they are cannot live without them” (Shils 1981, 304). Traditions,
particularly substantive traditions, are not backward rituals that can simply be discarded.
They are deeply engrained within the make-up of the traditional man.
In Tradition, Shils takes issue with much of academia and educated Western
society that view traditional beliefs, practices, and institutions as to be simply discarded
in favor of modern ones. Change must not be resisted, it must be accepted, better is to
seek change, and best is to initiate it (Shils 1981, 4). Shils understands that some
traditions, when vetted over time, may be subject to change by society. Shils analyses
both exogenous and endogenous factors regarding the changing of tradition. Rapid
modernization drastically alters the process for changing traditions.

Shils defines

tradition as simply a traditum, anything transmitted or handed down from the past to the
present (Shils 1981, 12). Modernization involves changing the way in which things are
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done and have been done. Modernization theory thus comes into direct conflict with
tradition, particularly if the modernization is drastic.
Like Thomas Kuhn, Shils believes that social sciences cannot neglect the past as
do the natural sciences by way of continuous accumulation. Shils lays out a detailed
overview of the importance of tradition in culture, which are intertwined and if drastically
altered, can negatively affect modernization efforts and society as a whole.
“As a temporal chain, a tradition is a sequence of variations on received
and transmitted themes. The connectedness of the variations may consist
in common themes, in the contiguity of presentation and departure, and in
descent from a common origin. Even in the course of a short chain of
transmission over three generations, a tradition is very likely to undergo
some changes. Its essential elements persist in combination with other
elements which change, but what makes it a tradition is that what are
thought to be the essential elements are recognizable by an external
observer as being approximately identical at successive steps or acts of
transmission and possession” (Shils 1981, 13-14).
Rapid modernization changes the essential elements of tradition and thereby alters the
fabric of a society. Slower changes allow society to adapt to changes made and further
allow for their acclimation to pre-existing traditions. Rapid modernization, however,
destroys the fabric of a society by altering the essential elements of tradition within a
culture.
David Apter
David Apter has been a comparative political scholar since the early 1950s. In
one of his more recent works regarding dependency and modernization theory,
Rethinking Development (1987), Apter has gone back and taken a fresh look at the
paradigm to which he, in previous years, analyzed a great deal. Rethinking development
is the goal. In pursuit of this goal, Apter states that “development is a continuous
intellectual project as well as an ongoing material process” (Apter 1987, 7). Apter
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believes that the discarding of modernization theory has largely been a mistake by the
field of comparative politics.
Apter states that terms such as development, modernization, and modernism
remain fundamental to contemporary thinking and benefit from the vigor of a serious
opposition” (Apter 1987, 8). This point of view is a stark contrast with more radical
views such as those of scholar Immanuel Wallerstein.

Wallerstein declared

modernization theory dead, “Requiescat in Pace” (Wallerstein 1976, 135).

Apter

maintains a much more useful approach to dependency and modernization theory in the
field of comparative politics.

Apter states in regards to the limitations of liberal

modernization and radical dependency theory “the question is whether it is possible in
more than an eclectic way to take selected ingredients from both and form a better
framework for contemporary analysis” (Apter 1987, 32). This study will utilize Apter‟s
use and definition of terms, as well as concepts regarding dependency and modernization
theory.
David Apter defines what he feels are important concepts such as growth,
development, and modernization, terms he feels are used indiscriminately. Apter defines
the term development as referring to expanding choice and choice referring to the range
of articulated alternatives available to individuals and collectivities (Apter 1987, 16).
Apter goes on to say that increasing choice always has been the central development goal
and “how to control access to choice and promote the sharing of it according to approved
rules and conditions of equality has been the special political concern of development”
(Apter 1987, 16). The term modernization, while closely aligned with industrialization,
has developed separately into two separate entities, Apter distinguishes these by referring
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to them as “modernization I” and “modernization II” (Apter 1987, 16). Modernization I
encompasses theoretical questions as to “how to best convert growing complexity into
social integration, how to create the nation by means of the state, and how to incorporate
within the state social networks that generate development” (Apter 1987, 16-17). For this
study, however, Apter‟s second line of modernization will prove more useful.
“Modernization II describes the contradictions of growth. Among these
are negative impacts of innovation on the labor force, the changing social
composition of classes in terms of increasing asymmetrical reciprocities,
growing inequality, and compensatory political controls. Modernization II
has stimulated a perspective opposite to the more “integrative”
assumptions of modernization theory. It is a form of conflict theory. It
emphasizes the way innovation and efficiency lead to retrenchment, and
how elimination of unprofitable enterprises and investment in capitalintensive rather than labor-intensive industry may result in the
“marginalization” of industrial labor. Economic efficiency can thus lead
to rising social overhead costs. Modernization II suggests that enlarging
choice – the ultimate goal – will require restricted access to it in the short
run in order to generate surpluses, authoritarian controls, discipline,
planning, and mobilization” (Apter 1987, 17).
Certain parallels should be able to be drawn between some aspects of Apter‟s second
entity of modernization and the preceding years leading up to the revolution in Iran
during their period of rapid modernization.
Another term Apter defined and associated with modernization is marginal.
Marginal does not just refer to the unemployed, but a subculture such as urban squatters
and others living on the fringes of a productive society (Apter 1987, 18). Those that
subscribe to modernization I believe that those that become marginalized are absorbed
into the new classes and groups created by the modernization process. Those that
subscribe to modernization II believe these groups continue to be marginalized.
“External hegemonies, multinational corporations, and other instrumentalities work for
their own interests” (Apter 1987, 19).

Traditional societies under this type of
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development are under decreasing control of their own economic resources over time and
maintain fewer choices in their lives. Again, the tenets of modernization II seem to be
more indicative of the political phenomena that took place in Iran leading up to the
revolution. “More and more frequently it is the marginalized groups, especially those
dispossessed of their lands and displaced from their communities, who form into semi
organized groups and press demands on governments under circumstances, economic and
political, that the latter are unwilling or unable to satisfy” (Apter 1987, 33). This is
particularly true regarding the traditional agrarian workers who were forced to move to
more urban areas. Those marginalized by modernization according to Apter, “live under
conditions of high uncertainty, great personal risk, and with few prospects for regular
work” (Apter 1987, 18). This situation would more than likely cause a great deal of
instability and violence within a society.
Apter also articulates what is believed to be another key aspect to the
revolutionary downfall of Iran, political development.

Apter defines political

development as “regimes, state systems, and political systems whose institutional
functions, evolve along with developmental equity,” requiring “greater participation and
elite accountability” (Apter 1987, 18).

This study will examine whether political

development failed to keep pace with the level of economic development that took place
in Iran. “Critics argue that the response to greater development and modernization is
such a far cry from a moving equilibrium that the more development and modernization,
the more disequilibrating are the consequences, that is, protest, violence, and insurrection,
coups, military regimes, and petty despotism” (Apter 1987, 25). We will examine this
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case to see if the consequences of modernization and development laid out by Apter
became a reality for the country of Iran.
Nils Gilman
Scholar Nils Gilman, in his work Mandarins of the Future (2003), and his
contributory work on Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global
Cold War (2003) also offer an invaluable critical look of modernization theory. Gilman
analyzes modernization theory‟s complex nature, ideological roots, and role regarding
United States foreign policy. Gilman states that modernization is, “rooted in the contrast
between “traditional” and “modern” societies, modernization theory posited the existence
of a common and essential pattern of “development,” defined by progress in technology,
military, and bureaucratic institutions, and the political and social structure” (Gilman
2003a, 3).
Gilman‟s analysis of modernization theory includes as part of its theoretical basis
the belief in the complete superiority of the Western lifestyle, its political structures, and
institutions. Gilman‟s analysis further reveals modernization theorist‟s belief in the
eventual destiny of the aggregation of the West and the Third World. He summarizes the
ideological perspective of modernization theorists;
“The world was homogenizing: all countries, insofar as they were
“modern,” would eventually look more or less alike, and modern people
would all think, act, feel, and behave more or less alike. The notion that
the world was converging from a congeries of traditional lifeways onto a
unique modernity was the central leitmotif of modernization theory”
(Gilman 2003b, 50-51).
It was the modernization theorists‟ position that the United States should act as the
archetype to the Third World as a development model for this process.
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Gilman also addresses the U.S. foreign policy Cold War tactics of tolerating
callous dictatorships in the names of modernity and security. Modernization theorists
believed that modernization was an inexorable process, but one that could be accelerated
by the right kinds of leaders (Gilman 2003b, 49).

Unfortunately, some of these

dictatorial leaders supported by the U.S. government may not have been in the best
interests of the people.
Nils Gilman‟s most relevant analysis in relation to this study is regarding his
identification of a segment of modernists termed “high modernists.” High modernists are
distinguished from other modernists by their “ruthless willingness to apply unrestrained
state force to achieve their modernist dreams” (Gilman 2003a, 11). Particularly after the
Communist victory in China in 1949, American scholars and diplomats perceived the
need to promote a more rapid, radical vision of modernization in postcolonial regions
during the 1950s and 1960s (Gilman 2003a, 11). This study will endeavor that Iran was
an example of this push for high modernization that was taking place during the Cold
War era.
Osvaldo Sunkel
Osvaldo Sunkel is a Chilean economist and developmental specialist in the area of
Latin America. Although Sunkel specializes in the Latin American region, his work is
applicable to other developing areas. Much of Latin America and the country of Iran are
similar in that they have both had persistent issues regarding development and intrusion
of the United States. Sunkel‟s development perspective is concerned with promoting
modernization, structural reform, productive transformation, and the diversification of
exports through industrialization and the adoption of technical progress (Sunkel 1993,
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18). Sunkel provides an ideological framework that better allows for peripheral countries
to develop from within. Sunkel believes that countries along the periphery are better off
in terms of their development if they can control their development strategy without
interference from the center.
“An underdeveloped country possessed quite distinctive features (very
different from the supposed well-functioning markets and full employment
of factors of production of neoclassical economics), where there was
ample availability of factors (particularly human and natural) but
insufficient capital. Capital is used here in the sense of a stock of
accumulated economic infrastructure (productive capacity, transportation,
energy, communications) that would enable the mobilization of those
resources, and capital in the sense of a flow of savings and investment that
could be added to them. This latter form of capital could be obtained from
two sources: from the better utilization of the surplus generated by the
export sector and from direct foreign investment or external financial
contributions” (Sunkel 1993, 27-28).
Sunkel certainly does not subscribe to the modernization theory paradigm that all
countries modernize in a similar fashion.
Sunkel not only believes countries develop differently, he feels they should
develop independently as well. “Independent efforts undertaken from within to achieve
self-sustained development” is Sunkel‟s goal for countries in the periphery (Sunkel 1993,
9). Sunkel‟s development strategy from within is “based on national effort and the
exploitation of our own resources (countries in the periphery), demands that we come
down from exaggerated levels of abstraction to the concrete consideration of the specific
availability of human resources and technology, the characteristics of size and location of
each country, the relation between population and natural resources, and the degree and
characteristics of urbanization” (Sunkel 1993, 56-57). These characteristics will vary for
each developing country and therefore will require individualized development strategies
as a result.
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Sunkel‟s economic ideological perspective for developing countries will be given
even more weight once modernization theory and foreign intervention is shown to be
debilitating to developing countries. Sunkel‟s economic philosophy of development from
within can then be seen as a legitimate way forward for developing countries around the
world, not just in Latin America.
Summary
Scholars Samuel Huntington, Edward Shils, David Apter, Nils Gilman and
Osvaldo Sunkel all agree that the paradigm of modernization theory will have an effect
on the country in which modernization is being applied.

According to Samuel

Huntington, Edward Shils, David Apter, and Nils Gilman; rapid modernization will have
a destabilizing effect on modernizing countries. Osvaldo Sunkel showed that countries in
the periphery require their own individualized development plan, though all developing
countries are better off developing from within. Modernization theory is therefore a
failure on one level or another from the perspectives of all five theorists. All five
theorists seem to agree that modernization theory was at its peak and in use as a paradigm
and theoretical framework during the 1950s and 1960s during the height of the Cold War
era.

Samuel Huntington best articulates the problems that occur when rapid

modernization is forced onto a traditional society by elites and social mobilization
outpaces political institutionalization.

Edward Shils articulates the importance of

substantive traditions in a society and how detrimental rapid modernization can be to a
traditional society. David Apter articulates his view that instability and violence are the
result of increased development and modernization. Perhaps the most recent scholar of
modernization, Nils Gilman, most appropriately gives a retrospective view of
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modernization theory and the United States central role in the development of, espousing
of, and the dissemination of this detrimental theory to many developing countries and
eager dictatorial regimes.
Another seemingly undisputed reality of modernization is that late modernizers,
countries attempting to modernize in recent times, are forced to modernize over a much
shorter period of time. The modernization theorists highlighted in this study have also
concluded that forced rapid modernization is due to change generated often by dictatorial
regime types and prevailing United States foreign policy during the Cold War. As a
result, traditional societies are forced to deal with many issues of modernization
simultaneously.

Samuel Huntington, Edward Shils, David Apter, Nils Gilman, and

Osvaldo Sunkel all agree that this route to modernization is unnatural and bound to be
problematic and cause instability within the modernizing society. It has been found that
this rapid pace of modernization is often the result of pressures from out of touch regime
types and the West.
The next chapter will analyze how modernizing regimes and Western
entrepreneurs have historically underestimated or simply failed to comprehend the ability
of traditional groups to resist, push back, and act as a counter balance to external
pressures to modernize. Historical examples of this have taken place throughout the
tumultuous history of Iran. The next chapter will focus on a few of the most glaring
examples. This will include the Reuter Concession (1872-1873), the Tobacco Revolt
(1894), the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911), and the modernization efforts made
by Reza Shah (1926-1941).
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The country of Iran is located between Asia and Mesopotamia. Iran came to
inhabit many ethnic groups over the centuries. These groups included; Arabs, Turks, and
Mongols. However, the first Iranians were Persians. Persians settled in Iran around one
millennium B.C., “descendants of an Indo-European group that originally migrated out of
central Asia, they were known as Aryans” (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 2). “The Golden
Age of Islam that set the standard of civilization between the eighth and eleventh
centuries A.D. came largely out of Persian art and knowledge” (Mackey and Harrop
1996, 6). Persians constitute approximately half of the population of Iran today. As a
nation, Iran has practiced the Shia sect of Islam since the sixteenth century.

Iran

maintains two distinct, but equally important traditions; the tradition of ancient Persia and
the tradition of Islam. These two ancient, intertwined traditions only recently became
introduced to the modernizing culture of the West.
“In the nineteenth century, Shia Persia met the Christian West. Until
1979, it was an uneven encounter in which Western nations sought
individually and collectively to use Iran as a pawn of their own interests.
Concurrently, the Iranians confronted the deeply disquieting challenge of
creating a modern civilization. In this weaving of Iran and the West,
tradition and modernization, the threads of Iranian identity knotted”
(Mackey and Harrop 1996, 6).
This chapter will analyze the initial modernization encounters between Iran and the West.
By analyzing these modernization efforts it is expected that a contrast will be
demonstrated between the initial modernization and the modernization that began in
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1953. By analyzing the Reuter Concession (1872-1873), the Tobacco Revolt (1894), the
Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911), and the modernization period of Reza Shah
(1926-1941) this study will better demonstrate the apparent differences between the
previous levels of modernization or attempted modernization and the subsequent rapid
modernization that is believed to have taken place under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.
Unlike the suspected extended period of modernization under Mohammad Reza
Shah, the previous efforts were met with immediate and successful challenges in the case
of the Reuter Concession and the Tobacco Revolt. These two events dealt with specific
issues that were somewhat narrow in focus, though still of considerable importance to
many Iranians at the time. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran was brought about by
cross-cutting segments of the Iranian population who wanted first and foremost a check
on the executive power of the shah. Additionally, the Constitutional Revolution of Iran
put in place laws such as; the creation of a Majles or parliament, and the creation of a
judiciary. All were the product of a delicate compromise by various groups in Iran that
were often unable to come to an agreement. Many Iranians supported the Constitutional
Revolution because they believed it was in the best interest of Iran. Unfortunately, their
hopes were dashed in the end by the shah and foreign powers. The last section of the
chapter will then analyze the period of modernization under Reza Shah. A period
believed to be of a more moderate modernization than the subsequent period brought
forth by his son, Mohammad Reza Shah.
This chapter will also establish the modern history of foreign intrusion into Iran.
Prior to the United States intervention beginning during the Cold War, it was Britain and
Russia that maintained dueling interests in Iran.
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“Iran‟s encounters with modernity began with her perennial military
conflicts with Russia, which also led to closer contacts with Britain and –
to a lesser extent – other European powers. Iran was thus introduced to
modern techniques of warfare, modern technology and, above all, the
European systems of law and government which tried to adopt with little
material success, although it was inevitably affected by the actions and
reactions involved in the process” (Katouzian 2009, 141).
This conflict largely began in 1804, with the outbreak of the Russo-Persian wars. The
British were motivated to keep the Russians from expanding their empire any further and
maintaining the status quo (Katouzian 2009, 142). The historic lines drawn in the contest
between Imperial Russia and Imperial Britain have inevitably shaped the Iranian role
(Learner 1958, 353). Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, who were engaged
in an ideological battle, Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century and early twentieth
century were exclusively interested in Iran for financial and territorial purposes. As a
result, Britain and Russia did not have any particular interest regarding the modernization
of Iran. The financial concessions Britain and Russia made with Iran, however, did
require some change or modernization but only as a byproduct of their financial dealings.
Iran was therefore under less foreign pressures during this historical period to modernize.
This was a stark contrast from the Cold War period when the U.S. foreign policy
paradigm was based heavily on modernization theory.
Reuter Concession (1872-1873)
During the mid-late nineteenth century, Britain sought successfully to exercise a
great deal of influence over the country of Iran. Britain‟s interest was in maintaining an
economic foothold in Iran. At the time, Britain was emerging as a leading commercial
partner of Iran. An increasing number of foreign concessions were being offered by
European investors to the shah of Iran, Naser al-Din. The shah encouraged these types of
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arrangements to fund his wealthy lifestyle and obtain new sources of government
revenues (Abrahamian 1982, 55). Concessions in essence were Iran‟s introduction to
government and foreign led modernization efforts.
“The first battle between the modern West and traditional Iran was not
fought on the battleground with guns and ammunition, but on the
ideological front. The collision of consciousness which took place at the
end of the nineteenth century was between two opposing forces. The
modern West, represented by the concession hunters and Iranian modern
intellectuals, who often played the role of the middle man, and traditional
Iran advocated by traditional intellectuals, the bazaar, and the majority of
the ulama. The modern intellectuals wanted to create modern institutions
and spread modern consciousness in Iran, and the traditional forces were
fighting not only to protect their social and economic interest but Muslim
morality, norms and values. The first phase of this struggle between the
„national‟ interest and the „foreign‟ interest, in this case Iran and the
United Kingdom, was the Reuter Concession” (Vakili-Zad 1996, 146).
Concessions allow for an investor, often foreign investors in the case of Iran, to help
economically develop an industry that had yet to be fully realized in that country. The
investor would pay the government for the agreement, the investor would employ
workers (often domestic and foreign), and the product or service would be developed.
“The modernization of Iran through foreign capital and direct foreign intervention in the
Iranian economy is known by the critics as the concession hunting era” (Vakili-Zad 1996,
147). Ideally, the government, the investor, and the workers would all financially benefit
and the country as a whole would benefit as well.

Unfortunately, concessionary

agreements did not always benefit everyone and in many cases did not set out to do so.
In 1872, a wealthy British citizen, Baron Julius Reuter, who amassed his wealth
through the news agency business negotiated a concession that became infamous and
synonymous with foreign intrusion in Iran.
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One Iranian government official, Lord

Curzon, a firm economic and political imperialist in his own right stated the following
regarding the Reuter Concession;
“When published to the world, it was found to contain the most complete
and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom
into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less
accomplished, in history. Exclusive of the clauses referring to railroads
and tramways, which conferred an absolute monopoly of both those
undertakings upon Baron de Reuter for the space of seventy years, the
concession also handed over to him exclusive working for the same period
of all Persian mines, except those of gold, silver, and precious
stones;…the exclusive construction of canals, kanats, and irrigation works
of every description; the first refusal of a national bank, and of all future
enterprises connected with the introduction of roads, telegraphs, mills,
factories, workshops, and public works of every description; and a farm of
the entire customs of the empire for a period of twenty-five years from
March 1, 1874, upon payment to the Shah of a stipulated sum for the first
five years, and of an additional sixty percent of the net revenue for the
remaining twenty. With respect to the other profits, twenty percent of
those accruing from railways, and fifteen percent of those derived from all
other sources, were reserved for the Persian Government” (Keddie 1966,
4-5).
Consequently, there was a strong backlash from the Iranian people for the shah giving
away so many of the countries developmental rights to a foreign investor. “Iranians in
general were suspicious of the real intention of foreign interest, as well as the sincerity of
their own government in granting concession to foreign companies” (Vakili-Zad 1996,
147). As a result, an anti-Reuter Concession coalition developed.
Due to the pressure being levied by Iranians, the shah sought to back out of the
concessionary agreement. The shah accomplished this through a provision contained
within the concession that stated that Baron Julius Reuter must start construction on his
railroad by a date certain or pay a penalty of 40,000 British pounds (Keddie and Yann
2003, 55). As a result, the shah was able to void the concession and in 1873 the
concession was cancelled and the deposit confiscated.
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The voiding of the Reuter Concession was an early victory for Iranians citizens
and select officials in the government opposed to the shah‟s granting of foreign
concessions. “Whatever the relative strength of the factors involved in the cancelation,
there is no doubt that the Reuter Concession called forth an internal protest which shook
the Iranian government and forced the shah to act in ways distasteful to himself” (Keddie
1966, 6). Most importantly, however, was the cancelation of the concession which was a
victory for late nineteenth century traditional society in Iran.
The cancelation of the Reuter Concession did not end concessions all together in
the country of Iran. In 1884, a more modest concession covering oil rights to a small area
in the foothills northeast of the Persian Gulf port of Bushire was granted to an A. Holtz, a
member of a British firm with extensive business interests in British India and the Middle
East (Paine and Schoenberger 1975, 4). Even Baron de Reuter was granted a more
moderate concession reinstating his former right to the operation of the Imperial Bank of
Persia and the exclusive working of Iranian mines (Paine and Schoenberger 1975, 4).
Traditional groups in Iran had failed to stop foreign intrusion through concessions to
foreigners, but through their actions in stopping the Reuter Concession they were able to
demonstrate that there was a limit to which they would allow such intrusion.
Tobacco Revolt (1894)
In 1890, another such British concessionary intrusion was granted.

This

concession was again granted by Naser Al-Din Shah, this time to the British Imperial
Tobacco Company owned by a Major Talbot. The agreement gave Major Talbot and
British Imperial Tobacco a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of all tobacco
in Iran for a period of fifty years (Paine and Schoenberger 1975, 4). This concession was
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similar to the Reuter Concession, yet differed in that it was limited exclusively to one
product; tobacco.
Despite the fact that the concession was limited to one product, the Iranian people
were equally enraged. This was due to the fact that tens of thousands of peasants grew
the highly prized tobacco, thousands of small merchants sold it, and hundreds of
thousands who smoked it realized that control of a product that came out of the sacred
soil of Iran had been handed to the British (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 141). Despite the
seemingly limited scope of the concession, the economic implication was equally
devastating when compared to the Reuter Concession. Protests began in the spring of
1891, when agents of the tobacco company began to arrive and post deadlines for the sale
of all tobacco to the company (Keddie and Yann 2003, 61). These protests involved
peasants and the middle class bazaar merchants due to the detrimental economic effect of
the concession.
The protests of the tobacco concession also elicited the assistance of the religious
ulama. Hajj Mirza Hasan Shirazi, leader of the Shi‟a ulama issued a fatwa forbidding all
Iranians to smoke tobacco (Vakili-Zad 1996, 150). The ulama became involved due to
their self-proclaimed role of tending to the interests of Iranian society. The traditional
peoples that inhabited Iran continued to be concerned over perceived European
domination. “A cable sent by Mirza Shirazi to the shah (January 1892) lists the danger of
foreign domination over Iran and the possibility that foreigners would dominate the
Iranian economy and commerce and contaminate Muslim ethics” (Vakili-Zad 1996, 150).
The fatwa issued by Shirazi was wide spread and successfully implemented.
“All over the country people broke their water pipes. Even the women in
the royal harem refused to consume tobacco or serve it even to the Shah
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himself. The use of the telegraph, installed by Malkum (Khan Malkum,
Freemason founder) years earlier, enabled the coordinating committee to
be in touch with supporters in Europe, Turkey, and Russia and even the
Shiite clergy in Iraq” (Price 2005, 137).
The religious ulama were essential in the assisting of other economically impacted
traditional groups in Iran. Consequently, in 1892, the shah was forced to cancel the entire
concession due to the well-organized demonstrations. “The movement was the first
successful mass protest in modern Iran, combining ulama, modernists, merchants, and
ordinary townspeople in a coordinated move against government policy” (Keddie and
Yann 2003, 62). It was the second time, however, that traditional groups in Iran defeated
the shah‟s efforts to modernize Iran at the expense of their traditions.
The Tobacco Revolt not only rebutted the shah‟s Western oriented modernization,
but was a rejection of Western encroachment. Iranian peasants took pride in the methods
they had developed to harvest their tobacco crops and the bazaar merchants maintained a
long history of selling tobacco products. Iranians were insulted and outraged at the
notion that a British company would be given the rights to their tobacco for a period of
fifty years. Middle East scholar and expert Nikki Keddie had the following historical
analysis regarding the Tobacco Revolt;
“The tobacco rebellion of 1891-92 shared with later revolutionary and
rebellious movements a substantial anti-imperialist and anti-foreign
component. Although this component is found in most of the world‟s
colonies and dependencies, anti-imperialism seems to have been stronger
and to have resulted in more mass rebellions and revolutions in Iran than
in most other Middle Eastern countries. Iranians have resisted foreign
domination more than have most other peoples” (Keddie 1995, 99-100).
This resistance, which resulted in the cancellation of the concession, came at great
personal embarrassment and public defeat for the shah. After the cancellation of the
concession, the religious edict forbidding the use of tobacco was lifted. This victory of
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the Tobacco Concession brought the bazaar and the ulama together for the first time - an
alliance that would be brought together during subsequent conflicts in Iran, namely the
Constitutional Revolution and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911)
After the Reuters Concession and the Tobacco Revolt many Iranians had a
festering distrust of the shah‟s government and a distain regarding foreign interference in
Iranian affairs.

In 1905, sugar merchants were forced to raise their prices due to

increasing international prices. This resulted in riots on the streets of Iran. Feeling
mounting pressure that had built-up over time, beginning with the concessions, the shah
promised a “house of justice” be assembled in addition to other concessions, but the shah
failed to deliver (Keddie 1983, 586). As a result, in 1906, revolt broke out.
The constitutional movement was motivated by an Iranian desire to develop a
government with diffused power and less influence from foreigners. Strong feelings of
nationalism developed, stemming from the memory of a former Persian empire. These
feelings were strongest among traditional groups such as the peasants, middle class
bazaar merchants, and the religious ulama.

The bulk of the reformers, however,

consisted of high government bureaucrats in Persian embassies abroad, the few Westerneducated Persians, and some graduates of the Darolfonun, Iran‟s first modern school
(Milani 1994, 27). Regardless of the diverse opinions expressed by the various groups,
“two concerns unified them: the creation of a code of written law and modernization from
above” (Milani 1994, 27). The Constitutionalists Movement in Iran thus developed after
the recent incidents involving the shah and his blind granting of concessions to European
powers.
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Despite contempt for the exertion of power and dominance by Europe, Iranians
admired their strength. Many Iranians believed that by developing a constitution it would
enhance their power. The Iranian constitution was modeled using mainly the Belgian and
to a lesser extent the French constitution. As stated, the Constitutional Revolution was
primarily an effort to reduce monarchical and foreign power. Despite the fact that
Iranians maintained a consensus regarding these fundamentals, each group had their own
self-interests for supporting the constitution.
“For the secular intellectuals, it translated into the adoption of some form
of Western liberalism. For the merchants, it equaled economic redress.
For the reformist clerics, it converted into strength for the Shia state. For
the traditionalist Mullahs and their followers, it stood for reestablishing
the Koran as the legal, political, social, and cultural model for society”
(Mackey and Harrop 1996, 143).
In the end, the constitution was reluctantly signed by Naser Al-Din Shah in 1906, just
prior to his death. The final draft of the constitution that was signed into law was more
Western than many traditional groups had desired. One of its detractors was Sheikh
Fazlollah Nuri, a prominent member of the ulama. Nuri and others who opposed the
constitution tried to at least tailor it to the principles of Islam by fighting for concessions
to be added. Nuri won a major concession for the ulama when he successfully fought for
a council of five mujtahids to review all legislation passed by the Majlis, having the
ability to reject any law contrary to Islam (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 150-151). This
became known as the Supplementary Laws of 1907. The provision, however, never went
into effect as the Constitutionalists were unwilling to concede power to their clerical
rivals in the Majlis. The Majlis in the end did broker peace by assuring the ulama that the
constitution would limit monarchial tyranny and not contradict Islamic law (Mackey and
Harrop 1996, 151). Of further help to the Constitutionalists came when three of Shiism‟s
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most respected scholars from the Shia religious center at Najaf, in Iraq, bestowed
religious sanction to the constitution (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 153). At the time it was
an overall victory for traditional groups in Iran. They had hoped that the shah‟s powers
would be diffused, foreign influence limited, and Islamic principles respected.
Following the Constitutionalist victory, Nuri, the outspoken clerical opponent of
the constitution was hanged for his opposition.

In 1911, under the new rule of

Muhammad Ali Shah, the shah‟s cabinet along with twelve thousand Russian troops led a
coup d‟état against the Majlis (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 155). The Russian troops under
command of the shah ordered the parliamentary deputies expelled or face death. This
marked the end of the Constitutionalist movement in Iran. In the final analysis it was the
two extremes that brought down all hopes of a constitution in Iran. It was the extreme
elements within the ulama like Nuri on one side and Western oriented modernizers on the
other that brought about its end.
“In trying to impose on Iran an alien culture, the modernizers unwittingly
robbed the Iranians both of their sense of identity and their chance to build
a new social order from their own traditions. For their part, the foreigners,
Britain and Russia, tragically denied the Iranians the time needed for the
political maturing process that should have occurred with the
establishment of the Majlis” (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 155).
What did occur is that the Constitutional Revolution in Iran introduced Iranians to
representative government, something that was previously inconceivable in the minds of
the traditional peoples of Iran. Understandably, many groups in Iran continued to be
increasingly resentful of the shah, Western led influence, and modernization.
Reza Shah’s Modernization Effort (1926-1941)
In late 1925, Reza Khan had come to power, becoming shah and founder of the
Pahlavi dynasty. Many Iranians during this period were ready to put previous divisions
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behind them. Reza Shah provided a strong military record and in the years leading up to
his taking of power provided stability in Iran by suppressing local tribal revolts. Iranians
had a feeling of nationalism at the time and Reza Shah was the strongest unifying leader
of the time.
“The Constitutionalists wanted a government that would modernize and
strengthen the Iranian state. After the internal disintegration and foreign
intervention during the Constitutional era and World War I, Iranian
nationalists of all major political parties came to believe that only a strong
military leader could give Iran the unity, strength, and modernity that the
Constitutionalists had sought. By the time of his coronation, Reza Shah
had become the receptacle of the nationalists‟ hopes” (Ansari 2001, 219).
Reza Shah sought to modernize and strengthen the state of Iran, both economically and
socially during his reign from 1926 to 1941.
Reza Shah had majority support in the Majlis, and most of the middle and upper
class younger Iranians. The new shah sought to modernize Iran economically through
reforms targeted at creating modern institutions such as: civil laws, primary and
secondary schools, universities, police forces, hospitals, modern military, and railways.
“Because the people of the Western world had achieved in a material sense many of the
things that he desired for his own country, Reza Shah seized aspects of the West as tools
with which to build Iran into a modern, sovereign country” (Mackey and Harrop 1996,
172). This was not dissimilar to previous shahs, though what was different was the way
in which the shah chose to fund these Western oriented modernizing projects. “While the
shah had sought the expertise of a foreign national in sorting out the country‟s finances,
he was unwilling to subject Iran to the same kind of financial enslavement to foreign
powers as the shahs before him had so readily done” (Kamrava 1992, 54). One of the
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unfortunate results was that many suffered economically due to the drastic increase in
taxes.
The biggest tax burden that was levied on Iranian people was in order to fund the
shah‟s pet project, the Trans-Iranian Railroad System.

Ironically, the North-South

railroad had little economic benefit, whereas an East to West railroad would have been
more useful (Ansari 2001, 224). Many of Reza Shah‟s economic expenditures were
designed more to demonstrate to foreigners the modernization efforts in Iran than to
create any real improvements in the lives of average Iranians.

“Despite major

expenditures of government money, and despite sincere efforts by some exceptionally
talented administrators, the most striking feature of this period is the failure of any
changes to extend beyond a fairly superficial level” (Ansari 2001, 221). The shah
implemented legislation that benefitted landlords, the shah himself being the largest
landowner at the time, and subjecting peasants to a military draft, and increased taxes on
sugar and tea. “The common soldiers, mostly from rural areas, were mistreated and
poorly paid during their two years of active service” (Ansari 2001, 225). Regarding the
improvements to education, “Iran still had over 90 percent illiteracy when Reza Shah
abdicated in 1941” (Ansari 2001, 225). As a result of these factors, the gap separating
the rich and poor widened during the sixteen year reign of Reza Shah.
“Altogether he thoroughly milked the country, grinding down the
peasants, tribesman and laborers, and taking heavy toll from the landlords.
While his activities enriched a new class of “capitalists” – merchants,
monopolists, contractors and politician – favorites – inflation, heavy
taxation, and other measures lowered the standard of living of the masses”
(Millspaugh 1946, 34).
Thus government changes to the economy were not meant to make permanent structural
improvements to the Iranian economy and were instead aimed at improving the wealth of
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the shah and the prestige of Iran in the face of the international community. The shah
overlooked some of the more basic things, like a major irrigation project or a city water
system (Paine and Schoenberger 1975, 15). These types of projects would have provided
the kind of structural modernization that Iran needed, yet would not have provided the
shah with the cosmetic changes that he sought.
In addition to the failed economic modernization, Reza Shah also attempted to
modernize Iran socially as well. The social changes that Reza Shah enacted were just as
superficial as the economic ones and even more Western. Shia Islam was victim to most
of these social changes. “Reza Shah decided to bypass Islam by connecting the notion of
modern Iran to a glorified image of ancient Persia” (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 177). The
shah began by mandating Western-style dress in an effort to make Iranians look more
Western and thereby more modern and sophisticated. In 1935, all men in Iran were
ordered to wear a fedora or bowler hat, which was the style in Europe, one to which few
Iranians had ever seen before (Atabaki 2007, 33). The problem with the bowler hat,
putting aside its Western origin, was the fact that it was billed and failed to allow Muslim
men‟s foreheads to touch the ground while engaged in prayer.
Reza Shah‟s modernization efforts encompassed more than just dress. Edifices of
buildings with heritage and charm of age were ruthlessly destroyed in sections of cities,
replaced with boulevards accessible to motorized vehicles, beggars were removed from
the streets, and banned was the use of camels for commercial transport (Mackey and
Harrop 1996, 173). Within the major cities, the shah sought to remove all visible signs of
tradition in Iran. The shah not only changed how the West perceived Iran, but they also
changed how they addressed the country itself. In 1935, upon the urging of Iranian
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diplomats stationed in Berlin, “the government announced that foreigners had to call Iran
just that instead of Persia, since Iran was the cradle of the Aryans” (Ansari 1996, 202).
The change that elicited the strongest backlash was regarding women‟s status in
the traditional Islamic society. Within the modernizing of women, no policy of the shah
was more controversial than the mandated removal of the chador or veil. Not even
scarves were permitted by the shah‟s government.
“By tearing away the veil, an emblem of religious traditionalism, Reza
Shah announced his intention to enlist women in the resurrection of Iran.
But the unveiling of women enraged the religious establishment” (Mackey
and Harrop 1996, 181).
The mandating that women be unveiled in public while embraced by the upper class
Western oriented women, those women observing the traditions of Islam felt disgraced
by leaving the home unveiled. Even those modernizing women who had campaigned
against the chador only desired its voluntary removal, not the forcing of all women to
remove it (Atabaki 2007, 34). Many women, as a result, stopped leaving their homes and
became isolated from much of the outside world during this modernizing period in Iran.
In 1941, with the outbreak of World War II, further implementation of Reza
Shah‟s reforms went on hold. At the conclusion of World War II, as a result of the shah‟s
pro-German stance, the British removed him from power and he was forced into exile.
After the shah‟s removal his social policies were quickly and easily reversed. Men and
women moved freely in the streets of Iran, wearing their traditional clothing without fear
of governmental retribution. Reza Shah‟s economic modernization policies, that did
nothing to improve the infrastructure of the country, came to an abrupt end as well.
“For all his efforts, Reza Shah, in the end, failed to shred the fabric of
traditional society. He wrested control of the army, parliament, and other
instruments of power but he never completely subverted the clergy. It all
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proved that Reza Shah, the ultimate Iranian nationalist, never came to
grips with how deeply Shiism contributes to national identity. No matter
how much the shah touted Iran‟s Persian past, Islam remained the other
strand of the Iranians‟ intertwined identity” (Mackey and Harrop 1996,
184).
Though Iranians were not pleased with the occupation of the British following World
War II, they were happy with the abdication of Reza Shah. As a result, for the first time
in years, Iranians could practice their traditional ways without being made to feel
backwards by their government. There is little doubt that if not for the allied victory in
World War II and the shah‟s forced exile he would have continued his modernization
efforts at an ever increasingly rapid pace, thereby becoming more detrimental and not as
easily reversible.

46

CHAPTER FOUR: PRIMARY CASE STUDY OF IRAN (1953-1979)
This chapter will begin by analyzing the possible significance of the United States
and British led coup against the Mossadegh government in 1953, which seemingly
allowed for a complete change in Iranian policy towards the distribution of oil, its
position regarding the West, and possible consolidation of power by the shah. This
chapter will also look at the subsequent policies of the shah regarding economic and
military growth, the sources of funding that allowed for this growth, and evidence of it
having led to urbanization, a duel economy between the old agricultural and service
society and the new industrialized service economy, and social mobilization. Some of
the other critical areas of the shah‟s modernizing policies will be analyzed, including;
land reform, women‟s suffrage, and literacy.

Political institutionalization will be

analyzed by looking at the shah‟s government and his policies of political participation
regarding the citizens whose lives were seemingly in transition. The chapter will then
close by analyzing any political instability that may have ensued as a result.
The United States and British Led Coup of the Mossadegh Government
In 1941, after the exile of Reza Shah, his son, Mohammad Reza Shah was sworn
in by the Majlis. Britain and the Soviet Union strategically occupied the northern area of
Iran. The shah, twenty-two years old at the time, watched with no military powers as his
country was occupied until the end of World War II in 1945. “For the first decade of his
reign, Mohammad Reza Shah survived as much as ruled” (Mackey and Harrop 1996,
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189). In the late 1940s nationalism had begun to gain strength due to the recent British
and Soviet occupation during the war. In 1949, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh formed a
nationalist organization, the National Front.
“The National Front was a reformist organization that represented the
aspirations of the middle class, with the objectives of safeguarding the
1906 constitution. Mossadegh‟s National Front quickly gained popularity
by calling for the nationalization of the oil industry. This gradually
evolved into a nationalist movement that represented the aspirations of a
whole nation and transcended the parochial interests of anyone group”
(Milani 1994, 39).
In 1951, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was appointed prime minister of Iran. Mossadegh‟s
tenure only lasted for twenty-eight months as prime minister. “For many among the
educated, Mossadegh is still the sun king who ruled in that brief moment when Iran lived
under neither Persian kingship nor Islamic theology” (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 195).
During this twenty-eight month period, post war occupation tensions developed
between Iran and the Western powers, particularly regarding the issue of oil. Due to the
continual atmosphere created by the occupying West, Iran maintained a sense of
nationalism.

The Mossadegh government was not interested in awarding any oil

concessions to Western countries and as prime minister he nationalized the oil industry.
This move aggravated the West, particularly Britain. The British had the most invested
economically in Iranian oil at the time with their oil firm; the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company.
“The British thought Iran‟s oil was by right British oil, and found the
Iranian demand to reclaim it outrageous. They were convinced that the oil
was theirs because the British had discovered, exploited, refined,
transported, and marketed it. That the oil had been under Iranian soil was
of little consequence in the minds of most British politicians” (Louis 2006,
731).
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Mossadegh‟s nationalization of the oil industry defied the desires of the Western world, a
world that relied on the use of oil. “Mossadegh was the first Middle Eastern leader to
defiantly nationalize a major Western-controlled industry” (Milani 1994, 39).
Mossadegh had to deal with serious economic difficulties as a result of his nationalization
policy. The biggest economic consequence of the nationalization policy was the resulting
Western boycott of Iranian oil and further sanctions imposed by the West on Iran (Milani
1994, 40). This nationalism, as courageous and proper as it was, would lead to the
downfall of the Mossadegh government.
Another issue for the Mossadegh government involved its handling of the Tudeh
Party. Though the Mossadegh government did not ally itself with the communist Tudeh
Party, Mossadegh‟s liberalism in Iran allowed the Tudeh party to operate in the open and
increase its influence. In addition, the nationalization policy was viewed by the West as
being ideologically in line with a leftist government. These facts led to growing concerns
by the British and United States governments. A CIA report generated in January 1953,
stated the following; “If present trends in Iran continue unchecked beyond the end of
1953, rising internal tensions and continued deterioration…are likely to lead to a
breakdown of governmental authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption
of control by the Tudeh Party” (Central Intelligence Agency 1953, 1). During this period
of the Cold War, the United States had seen Czechoslovakia and Korea fall to the Iron
Curtain. The United States did not want to see Iran fall to communism as well.
On July 11, 1953, the United States government approved operation TP-AJAX,
later known simply as AJAX. The British government also approved the operation on
their end, calling it “Operation Boot.” The U.S. and British governments convinced the
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shah to sign the orders dismissing the Prime Minister Mossadegh and installing General
Zahedi. Mossadegh, however, upon discovering the plot had General Zahedi arrested and
the shah fled Iran. On August 19th, CIA and MI6 agents helped organize demonstrations
that turned violent and ended up removing Mossadegh from office.

This foreign

intervention put General Zahedi in as prime minister and Mohammad Reza Shah as the
leader of Iran‟s constitutional monarchy. Before the coup of 1953, Iranians had “deep
admiration for the United States,” after the coup the United States lost much of its
creditability and respect with Iranians (Milani 1994, 42). This event marked a passing of
the torch from the fading colonial powers of the once British Empire to the growing
empire of the United States. The United States would now officially take over the
leading role of foreign intruder into Iranian affairs.
Modernization: the Policies of Mohammad Reza Shah and Western Influence
The foreign intrusion of the United States, unlike with the Mossadegh
government, was welcomed by the Zahedi government and the shah. In fact, the new
Iranian government began to increase pressure on the U.S. for new levels of economic
and military aid. The shah wrote in his book, Mission for My Country (1961), published
eight years after the coup, that “since American military and other aid has brought my
country such important direct and indirect benefits, I hope I shall not sound ungrateful if I
state my conviction that we have been receiving glaringly inadequate amounts of it”
(Pahlavi 1961, 312). Therefore, in 1953, the Iranian government, following the coup did
a one-eighty regarding their view of Western influence. The United States was counting
on this change in policy, as revealed in President Eisenhower‟s National Security Council
report in 1953; “Over the long run, the most effective instrument for maintaining Iran‟s
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orientation towards the West is the monarch” (Alexander and Nanes 1980, 268).
Additionally, in 1953, President Eisenhower declared that “the United States must block
communism in Iran and other Asiatic countries as “interference” in Iran‟s internal affairs”
(Eisenhower Draws Fire of Iran Press 1953, 14). This was a dubious declaration by
President Eisenhower considering the recent coup in Iran, orchestrated by the U.S.
government.
Due to the new relationship between the shah and the United States government,
Iran sought out increased levels of economic and military aid to build a modernized
industrial society with an equally advanced military. One of the key aspects of rapid
modernization is economic development. Dealing with the oil dispute was the first order
of business in this regard. Resolving the oil dispute would increase revenues for Iran and
increase the likelihood of additional aid from the United States. The additional revenues
were in an effort to fund the shah‟s new modernization program, dubbed the „Great
Civilization,‟ which was aimed at modernizing Iran to an extent previously unseen.
The shah‟s plea for increased aid from the United States was quickly answered.
On September 5, 1953, President Eisenhower granted $45 million to Iran, plus an
additional $100 million for military aid and technical assistance (Doty 1953, 3). U.S.
economic and military aid continued to increase annually. On May 8, 1954, the U.S.
added another $9 million in additional emergency financial aid to Iran (U.S. Adds
$9,000,000 to Iran‟s Aid Grant 1954, 54). By November 2, 1954, the United States had
offered Iran $127,300,000 in loans and grants to “support the country until its oil
revenues can finance a “large-scale” development program” (U.S. Confirms Iran Aid
1954, 9).
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The aid by the United States did not come without strings though. Increased U.S.
aid came with an increase in U.S. economic and military advisors as well. These advisors
were engaged in much of the modernizing reforms eventually put forth by the shah.
Reforms that U.S. advisors were directly involved in include the establishment of an
Iranian banking system, and arranging contacts between the Iranian government and U.S.
businesses. (Saikal 1980, 53). These U.S. advisors assisted the Iranian government in
disseminating these U.S. aid funds as well.

Additionally, members of the Iranian

government met with State Department officials and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development regarding the establishment of an Industrial
Development Bank of Iran sponsored by U.S. banking and industrial interests in the U.S.
and Europe (Heffernan 1959, F1). The United States generously assisted in aiding Iran in
order to get oil agreements in place that would get Iranian oil back into the world market.
On August 5, 1954, an agreement was reached by the Iranian government and a
pact of eight international oil companies. Five of the eight of which were from the
United States. The U.S companies in the consortium included; Standard Oil Company
(New Jersey), Standard Oil of California, Socony Vacuum, the Texas Company, and the
Gulf Oil Corporation (Hangen 1954a, 1). The agreement gave Iran $420 million in
revenue (Hangen 1954a, 1).

Iran agreed to pay $70 million over ten years as

compensation to the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that was nationalized
under the Mossadegh government (Hangen 1954a, 1). The consortium contract was for a
term of twenty-five years, with a virtually automatic fifteen year renewal (Hangen 1954a,
1). “In theory, the National Iranian Oil Company remained in charge, but in reality this
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consortium gained full control over management, refining, production, and distribution of
oil” (Ansari 2001, 74).
After the agreement was finalized and tankers began loading oil in the Persian
Gulf, it had been a period of three and a half years since Iranian oil had been on the
market due to the mid-1951 nationalization (Carmical 1954, F1). Dr. Mossadegh, now
serving a three year prison sentence, stated from jail that the new oil pact is an “insult” to
the nation and it means the “enslavement of my country for forty years” (Oil Pact Insults
Iran, Mossadegh Says in Jail 1954, 8). Obviously, the U.S. and Great Britain saw the oil
deal as being significantly beneficial to the West.
The Iranian government felt that the oil deal would be beneficial to their interests
as well. The shah had a five year development plan that would be devoted to drastic
increases in the agricultural sector, funded partially by oil revenues. Prime Minister
Zahedi stated that “the oil agreement is the key to the rehabilitation of our economy, but
the oil income alone will not be sufficient to generate the comprehensive economic
expansion we envisage…Iran would prefer further United States assistance” (Hangen
1954b, 1). The United States was more than willing to provide this economic assistance
to the Iranian government. From 1951 to 1967, the United States provided Iran $605
million in economic development aid, $122 million in surplus food under Food for Peace,
and $77.5 million in development loans (U.S. and Iran Celebrate the End of Aid Program
1967, 13).
The United States was not the only large source of aid for Iran during this period
either. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) gave
Iran a loan for $75 million, a loan of this type having never been granted by the World
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Bank to that point (Brewer 1956, 63). The loan was agreed to be paid back through oil
revenues (Brewer, 1956, 63). The Iranian government leveraged its economy heavily
upon the generation of those revenues, revenues dependant on the consumption of their
oil by the United States and others.
“The international financial permissiveness that began to prevail in the late
1960s and increased in the 1970s made it possible to evade most of the
emerging problems. During those years – characterized by easy access to
abundant external financing – concern for development theory, strategies,
and medium and long term concerns and policies waned; everything
seemed solvable through external financing” (Sunkel 1993, 32).
The peripheral country of Iran had become dependent on the Western center, the U.S., for
economic aid to fund their rapid modernization. The aid that the shah received from the
U.S. was not contributing to the economic development of Iran, more accurate would be
to consider it as aiding the economic growth. Osvaldo Sunkel stated that countries along
the periphery need to develop independently, otherwise they fail to control their
development or to truly develop at all. This is exactly what was taking place under the
rapid modernization policies of the shah.
As stated by scholar Samuel Huntington, the prevailing assumption of American
foreign policy in the Cold War era was that economic assistance promotes economic
development, and economic development promotes economic stability (Huntington 1968,
6). This prevailing assumption was called into question in a study conducted by Peggy
and Pierre Streit in 1958, which focused on aid provided by the United States to Iran over
a ten year period. Appropriately they focused their study on those to whom the aid
should be benefitting the most, the peasant class in Iran. They found the following;
“One of the first technical assistance projects was the improvement of
local crops. In three years, the use of an inexpensive insecticide wiped out
an age-old wheat scourge and, as a result, the crop yield was more than
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doubled. In theory this would have seemed a sizable boon to the peasants.
In fact, it was not, because of Shahabad‟s (an Iranian village) ancient landtenure system. Under the system, one-fifth of the crop is allotted to the
man who owns the land; one fifth to the man supplying seed; one-fifth to
the man supplying water; one-fifth to the man supplying beasts of burden;
one-fifth to the man supplying labor. In Shahabad, as in much of Iran, the
impoverished villager supplies only the labor, and hence receives only
one-fifth of the land‟s fruits. The landlord who, as supplier of the land,
seed, water, and beasts received a doubled four-fifths share” (Streit 1958,
SM7).
They therefore found that just because an assistance program makes sense in the West, it
may not necessarily have the same results in a society that has not attained the same level
of social and political development (Streit 1958, SM7).
Another example in the same vein took place on Iranian cattle farms.

One

hundred Holstein cows were transported to Iran from the United States in an effort by the
shah to spur cattle production, within weeks 90 percent of the newborn caves died
(Weinraub 1973, 11). Iran still had primitive farming techniques and was ill equipped to
handle this new influx of Western cattle. Scholar David Apter articulated in his second
line of modernization or modernization II that countries in which were “highly
modernized but not fully industrialized” were exposed to the “negative impacts of
innovation on the labor force” (Apter 1987, 17). This was yet another micro level
example of modernization that did not easily transfer from the West to Iran.
These examples reinforce Osvaldo Sunkel‟s basic argument that countries
develop differently and should also develop independently.

“Independent efforts

undertaken from within to achieve self-sustained development,” as characteristics will
vary for each developing country and therefore will require individualized development
strategies (Sunkel 1993, 9). Additionally, scholar Edward Shils stated the following;
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“A foreign society might be admired but this admiration did not require
that one‟s own society should be remade so that it became like the
admired one. Nor was it thought that there was a natural, temporal order
of development in accordance with which there was an obligation to
conform with a norm derived from this temporal order” (Shils 1981, 288).
The shah and the United States government were operating under the ideological premise
that rapid Western modernization, funded through the infusion of high levels of economic
aid and oil revenues, could be achieved in a developing agrarian society.
In the beginning stages, the Iranian government had seemingly made a good
economic decision by betting on increased revenues through oil. In 1955, crude oil
production in Iran averaged 326,000 barrels a day and in 1956, it was up to 534,000 (Iran
Nets $152,103,879 1957, 61). In 1957, it increased to 716,000 barrels a day and in 1958,
it increased further to 821,000 (Iran‟s Output of Oil Increased in 1958 1959, 32).
Through 1968, Iran was averaging 2.84 million barrels a day (Lydon 1969, 7). By 1973,
when the energy crisis hit the United States, it overwhelmingly increased oil revenues
above and beyond the increases that had already been seen in the preceding years. In
1974, the shah revised his fifth five-year development plan as oil revenues quintupled to
almost $20 billion (Iranian Oil Revenues Said to Quadruple 1975, 57). This also meant
that Iran became even more dependent on the United States and other oil consuming
countries.

One tends to think of the United States dependence on oil from Arab

countries, in this case Iran. In many instances though, it is equally if not more true that
the oil producing countries are dependent on oil revenues from other countries.
“Iran, trying to develop economically and industrially, is in an acute stage
of growing pains. The country has a seven-year plan and more than
$100,000,000 a year of oil revenues to put it into effect. These assets are
proving both a blessing and a headache to Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, the plan
organization director. He is trying to develop economic maturity in a
country that appears to be economically adolescent. The once lush land of
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the Persians is ambitious to recapture its ancient prestige and selfsufficiency – following the new Western ways. The plan is running on an
allocation of about 60 per cent of the $234,000,000 oil royalties a year
now being paid to the government by international petroleum companies
doing business here” (Walz 1958, 14).
Oil subsidies allowed various sectors of the economy to remain inefficient, unproductive,
and dependant on the West. This was the situation Iran found itself in due to the rapid
Western style modernization implemented by Mohammad Reza Shah.
Due to the increased revenues generated from Iranian oil and modernization
efforts, a dramatic increase in foreigners living and working in Iran took place. By 1974,
approximately 15,000 Americans were in Iran; 2,500 for military programs and contracts,
others in banking, engineering, architectural firms, communications corporations, and
other corporate enterprises (Clarity 1974b, 12). This contributed to the anti-American
sentiment.
Another effect of the revenues generated from oil and foreign aid was that the
shah‟s government was able to escape the levying of many taxes on its citizens. This was
beneficial to Iranian society in that they were not over burdened with high taxes as had
been the case in the past. It also meant that the wealthy in Iran gained even more wealth
while the peasants remained impoverished. In addition, the lack of taxation allowed the
shah, in his mind, to begin his modernization process without the input of the citizenry.
One of those areas regarded the modernization of the Iranian military. From 1954
to 1967, Iran received about $1.3 billion in American military aid (A Reform-Minded
Ruler 1967, 10). The shah did not discriminate regarding the country he was willing to
purchased arms from either. The shah signed a $110 million deal in 1967, for Soviet
arms, trucks, and communications equipment (Smith 1967, 1).

57

However, this deal

proved an exception as Iran received almost all of its military aid from the United States.
Under the Nixon administration in 1971, the shah was allowed to purchase unlimited
quantities of the most advanced conventional weaponry the U.S. had to offer (Zahedi
2000, 155). One of Nixon‟s main motives for allowing Iran to build up its military with
such sophistication was in an effort to keep Iran under Western influence. Cold War
politics dictated at the time that the Soviets not gain a foot hold in the Eurasian land
mass.
In 1973, with the additional, unexpected revenues from oil the shah increased the
military budget. The budget went from $290 million in 1963, to $1.9 billion in 1973, and
in 1978, reached $8 billion (Amirahmadi and Parvin 1988, 59). This constituted “the
most rapid buildup of military power under peacetime conditions of any nation in the
history of the world” (Klare 1984, 108). OPEC‟s new pricing policy gave the shah even
more oil revenues than expected beginning in 1973. The shah spent much of these
revenues on rapid modernization of the Iranian military.
“In 1973 alone, the shah invested $3 billion in military hardware. The
shah‟s proliferating arsenal included laser-guided bombs, a hundred-plus
F-4 Phantoms, KC-135 aerial tankers to refuel the Phantoms, nearly 1,800
state-of-the-art tanks, a fleet of American C-130 transport aircraft, and the
largest military Hovercraft fleet in the world. At the same time, a naval
base at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf and a vast new military complex at
Chah Bahar on the Indian Ocean were rising out of the sand and virgin
jungle” (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 244).
The shah‟s military spending may seem to have been a good idea on the surface but there
were a few underlying problems.

First, there was little evidence that the military

establishment was consulted prior to purchasing weapons systems and it would have been
equally unlikely that the military elite would have challenged it (Afshar 1985, 182).
Second, as a consequence, many times parts of equipment were bought and the
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complementary one was not purchased (Afshar 1985, 182). Aside from the debt that this
put Iran in, it helped further solidify the dependence on the United States.

Iran‟s

substantial U.S. based militarization had additional influences. English had become the
basic language for many military activities in Iran (Pace 1976b, 1). Iranian intelligence
acquired a gigantic U.S. designed communications monitoring installation (Pace 1976b,
1).

Also, due to thousands of U.S. military experts in Iran, the real-estate market

skyrocketed (Pace 1976b, 1). Even the armed forces of Iran, who were almost entirely
equipped by the United States, had become heavily westernized.
Further evidence of how dependant Iran had become on the United States was
evident when Jimmy Carter was elected president of the United States. Jimmy Carter‟s
politics were different than that of Nixon‟s and Ford‟s, who imposed no restrictions on
the shah‟s military spending, with nuclear weapons as the only exception. Shortly after
being elected to office in 1977, Carter enacted the Presidential Decision Memorandum
13. This memorandum placed a cap on arms sales to all countries except the members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), New Zealand, and Israel” (Vance 1983,
319). The Carter administration continued to sell arms to Iran, however, restrictions were
imposed that the shah was not accustomed to. These limits did little to help Iran‟s
domestic economy though. Even with the shah being limited from buying a few items,
he continued buying others, the military budget continued to rise. In March 1978, the
shah pressed ahead with his plans for a massive naval expansion worth more than $5
billion and Carter allowed the sale of close to $600 million worth of U.S. arms to go
forward (Mackey and Harrop 1996, 279). This exorbitant spending by the shah only
resulted in further deficit spending and a continued increase in U.S. dependence.
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After receiving economic and military aid from the United States, and while
continuing to settle the oil dispute, land reform was another important area of
modernization for the shah. The shah initially sought to sell off much of his crown lands.
Later, the shah instituted land reforms that came later under the shah‟s “White
Revolution.” The sales of the shah‟s lands were to be made to the peasants who were
residing on and cultivating the various royal lands. On its face, the shah‟s land reform
seemed a selfless act, meant to empower the peasants and give them better opportunities
to gain wealth. The shah had been attempting to sell these lands since January 1951,
when he issued an edict arranging for the sale of much of his lands to the peasants (Shah
of Iran to Cut Up His Estates into Farms for Sale to Peasants 1951, 1). The Mossadeh
government prohibited the shah from selling the lands however. This prohibition was put
in place based on grounds that the lands had been illegally acquired by the shah‟s father,
Reza Shah, and thus were not legally transferrable (Majd 2000, 73). After the successful
coup, the shah saw his chance to sell the lands that were illegally confiscated by his
father.

The shah disposed of his crown lands “as rapidly as he could create the

administrative machinery to do it” (Hunt 1960b, 3). Sales resumed in 1953, and were
completed in 1962 (Majd 2000, 73). The terms of the land reform bill called for the
principle used for the shah‟s lands to be applied to private holdings (Hunt 1960b, 3). The
shah claimed that he did not personally benefit from the sale of the Pahlavi estates, as the
purpose of the land reform was to increase farm production and spread social justice
(Hunt 1960b, 1). The records that would have shown whether or not the shah received
any funds related to the sale of these lands were never made public.
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Due to the focus the shah placed on land reform, the agrarian society in Iran
believed that agricultural sector of the economy was going to be a growing one. Despite
the shah‟s emphasis on land reform in his modernizing society, the shah stated the
following;
“Iran must be prepared to shift away from the agriculture and toward
industry. The 75-25 ratio of agriculture to industry must be completely
reversed in not more than one generation if Iran is to catch up with the
advanced nations in the world” (Mehravari 1965, 68).
Samuel Huntington stated the following regarding the shift from an agrarian society to an
industrial one during the process of rapid modernization;
“Agriculture declines in importance compared to commercial, industrial,
and other nonagricultural activities, and commercial agriculture replaces
subsistence agriculture. The geographical scope of economic activity is
far greater in modern society than in traditional society, and there is a
centralization of such activity at the national level, with the emergence of
a national market, national sources of capitalism, and other national
economic institutions” (Huntington 1971, 287).
In addition to the growth that many in the agrarian sector of the Iranian economy
expected, they were also in need of additional revenues for this growth to take place. It
was estimated in 1960, that as much as $5 billion would be needed for seed, agricultural
tools, and marketing services in order for the lands to thrive (Hunt 1960b, 3). At the time
Iran‟s oil revenues totaled only $250 million a year (Hunt 1960b, 3). Another problem
for these new land owning peasants was that most were in debt to the landlords and
money lenders. It was estimated that the debt peasants in Iran owed to the landed gentry
was approximately $5 million in total (Hunt 1960b, 3). Thus, in order for the peasants to
begin to accumulate any additional wealth for themselves they needed the government to
do more than give them barren land to plow.
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Beginning in January 1963, the shah introduced some well intentioned
progressive reforms to Iran. This first set of initial provisions was dubbed the “White
Revolution”. It was termed the “White Revolution” because it was to be a revolution
without bloodshed. This “White Revolution” included six initial provisions; land reform,
nationalization of forests, sale of state-owned enterprises to the public, a workers profitsharing plan, women‟s suffrage, and creation of the Literacy Corps. The shah proudly
admitted that that his reforms were more modernizing than any reforms previous in Iran.
“My program is the most progressive ever offered this country. I think I
can claim it is more advanced than any you will find elsewhere in the Free
World today” (Walz 1963a, 2).
The shah subsequently wrote in his book, The White Revolution of Iran (1967), the
following;
“Iran needed a deep and fundamental revolution that could, at the same
time, put an end to all the social inequalities and all the factors which
caused injustice, tyranny and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction
which impeded progress and kept society backward” (Pahlavi 1967, 15).
The “White Revolution” was a first step by the shah‟s government in an effort to
modernize Iran.

Land reform, women‟s suffrage, and the Literacy Corps were the

priorities among the provisions.
Many of these modernizing provisions were pushed by the United States
government, at the time under the Kennedy administration.

“The Kennedy

administration considered land reform an effective deterrent against communist
expansion or an agrarian revolution of the Chinese type and a prerequisite of the success
of any industrialization program” (Milani 1994, 45). Iranians overwhelmingly backed
the shah‟s reform laws. In a vote, 4,912,871 Iranians supported the shah‟s referendum
and only 3,824 Iranians voted against (Iran Voters Overwhelmingly Endorse Shah‟s
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Reforms 1963, 1). Obviously, the reforms were popular at the time in Iran. The land
reforms called for a centuries old feudal system to be changed almost overnight.
The first phase of the land reform under the shah‟s “White Revolution” reform
began in 1962. Under the land reform large landlords, defined as those who owned more
than one village, were required to sell their land to the government for fifteen year bonds
(Walz 1963b, 3). The land was then resold to the peasants, with preference given to
peasants that have previously worked the land. Landlords were permitted no more than
1,200 acres of land and could only keep this land if they modernize it by utilizing
machinery and paid farm help in real wages (Walz 1963b, 3). By the end of the first
phase of land reforms 10,003 villages were purchased from the major landlords; 344,017
householders owned land as a result of land reform (Shah Opens Second Phase of Land
Reforms in Iran 1965, 25). This first phase of land reform was popular with the peasant
population, which comprised 75 percent of the Iranian population. The landownings
“Thousand Families”, powerful landlord tribal chiefs, “lost their socio-legal base and
were thus liquidated as a class” (Arjomand 1988, 73). While the first phase was voted on
and Iranians were therefore allowed input, their expectations were drastically raised as
well.
The second phase of land reform began in 1965. This phase of reforms was more
complicated than the first.

The second phase involved divesting smaller landlords,

defined as those who owned one village or less, of some of their lands. Smaller landlords
were more likely to depend on their lands for income than the larger landlords. The
smaller landlords that were affected by the second phase of reforms were estimated at
100,000 Iranians and who owned approximately 63 percent of the land in Iran (Walz
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1964, 15).

The second phase of land reforms was also popular with the peasant

population in Iran and peasants continued to place higher expectations regarding their
plight in rural Iran.
In 1969, the third and final phase of land reform began. This third phase of
reforms was in an effort by the shah to abandon primitive farming methods in favor of
Western mechanized methods (Weinraub 1973, 11). The third phase of reforms also
required farmers to enter government run cooperatives. Many farmers resisted these
reforms because they found it “alien” and contrary to their traditions to share their water
and crops and work (Weinraub 1973, 11). Developmental theorist Edward Shils made
the following observation that is directly on point;
“Modern technology, in its wide utilization, has brought about so many
changes in the organization of labor, in the distribution of the population,
and in the standard of living, so many new pleasures and new problems,
that it seems utterly alien to anything traditional. The appearance of the
new machines and the new products is vastly different from what was used
and produced a century earlier. The scale of the application of their new
technology is also unprecedented” (Shils 1981, 82).
When the third phase was instituted, the shah had removed the feudal landlord families
that had controlled the agrarian economy of Iran for centuries. In the final analysis,
however, the shah simply replaced control of the lands from the landlords to that of the
government. The peasants had no reason to have a great deal of trust in either the
landlords or the government. In doing this the shah also managed to anger and frustrate
the peasant population with the implementation of the third phase by forcing changes in
their traditional methods on farming lands. The peasants essentially had their hopes
dashed after being raised upon the implementation of the first two land reform phases.
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The second largest rapid modernizing reform under the “White Revolution” was
the implementation of women‟s suffrage. Under the reform, women were now made
citizens and given the right to vote. On September 14, 1963, roughly nine months after
passage of the “White Revolution” women voted for the first time ever in Iran (Iranian
Women to Vote Tuesday 1963, 8). Men were also limited to a maximum of two wives
and the husband was required to get the permission of the first, and the state had to
approve it as well (Pace 1967, 1). Additionally, men seeking divorce must go through
procedures more complex than just saying three times “Talagh” – “I divorce thee” (Pace
1967, 1). Unlike his father, Mohammad Reza Shah did not ban the wearing of the veil by
women, but instead maintained a policy of discouraging its use (Lewis 1978, SM17).
The traditional groups in Iran, mainly the clergy, denounced and protested the
reforms, stating that it was against Islam and their traditional ways.
“The disenchantment of the mullahs with the shah…is focused on the
shahs 15-year-old modernization drive, in which he has taken away much
of their property and power. His land reform program stripped the Shiite
religious establishment, the second largest landowner in the country, of its
holdings, and other measures ended their jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce and their control of education” (Gage 1978c, 1).
On the other side, women‟s associations also protested declaring their support in favor of
women‟s suffrage (Frankel 1963, 1). The state and progressives on the one side and the
clergy on the other, clashed in the streets of Teheran as a result.
“Two days of riots, looting, street fighting and clashes between supporters
of the majority Shiite Moslem sect and the security forces. According to
official figures, 86 persons were killed and 200 wounded following the
arrest of Rouhollah Khomaini, a mullah or religious leader, for his
opposition to Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi‟s land reform and the
granting of suffrage to women” (Teheran is Quiet after 2 Day Riots 1963,
6).
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The “White Revolution” was no longer a “white” revolution, it had become stained red.
In the midst of this violence, the shah, rather than demonstrating a willingness to
engage in positive dialogue with the traditional groups in Iran, he insulted them. “We are
done with social and political parasites; I abhor the „black reaction‟ (the clergy) even
more than the „red destruction‟ (the Marxists)” (Farmayan 1971, 105). In the shah‟s
efforts to attain women‟s suffrage in Iran he did the movement a disservice by blatantly
disrespecting the traditional and religious elements. Much blame lay with the shah as to
why women‟s suffrage became such a divisive issue. There is no doubt that regardless of
how the shah handled the implementing of women‟s rights, it would have faced clerical
challenge. The shah, however, decidedly stoked the fire.
Another area in which the shah aggravated the ulama was in regards to the Iranian
calendar. The shah, in his continuing pursuit to modernize Iran in every conceivable
area, decided to change the Iranian calendar from Islamic to Persian.

The change

backdated the Iranian calendar to Cyrus the Great and the establishment of the first
Persian Empire in the sixth century B.C. (Pace 1976a, 8). This change further offended
the religious ulama and other traditional groups in Iran. Additionally, five years earlier in
1971, the shah had held an extravagant celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the
Persian Empire. This also upset many of the ulama in Iran.
The third major area of modernization under the shah‟s “White Revolution” was
the establishment of a Literacy Corps. It was estimated at the time that 80 to 85 percent
of the Iranian population was illiterate (Article 1 -- no Title 1965, 3). Starting in 1963,
when the reforms were signed into law, 10,000 Iranian high school graduates with an
extra four months of training, and after attaining the rank of third lieutenant were
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assigned a village to teach 400,000 to read and write (Article 1 -- no Title 1965, 3). In
1964, 52 percent of children attended primary school, but in villages it was only 27
percent (Article 1 -- no Title 1965, 3). By the early 1970‟s, 28 percent of the population
was literate (Wedemeyer 1976, LI4). By 1977, government records stated the literacy
rate was at 44 percent (Statesman‟s Yearbook, 1978). In late 1978, just prior to the
revolution, the shah placed the literacy rate at over 50 percent (Gage 1978a, SM12). This
was a commendable improvement in the literacy rate of Iran in a relatively short period
of time. The shah, however, did not simply wish to improve the literacy rate. The shah
wanted education in Iran to mirror the West, as with everything else he sought to
modernize.
The educational system in general went through a rapid modernization process.
Traditionally, the educational system in Iran was based out of the mosques. Under the
shah, children were mandated to attend primary and secondary schools as the educational
systems were rapidly modernized. Many traditional Iranians felt that along with the oil
revenue dependence and the United States-Iranian arms deals, the educational system was
the third area that was being encroached upon by westernization. Between 1963 and
1977 the educational system developed through a threefold expansionist policy (Hiro
1985, 53). There was a doubling of enrollment to secondary schools (Hiro 1985, 53). In
addition, there was a rise in the student body of technical, vocational and teacher training
colleges from 14,240 to 227,500 (Hiro 1985, 53). Lastly, there was an increase in the
university population from 24,885 to 154,215 and an increase of Iranian students at
foreign (mainly Western) universities from 18,000 to 80,000 (Hiro 1985, 53-54). In
1978, there were 67,000 Iranian students that went to college in Western nations (Unesco,
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1981, 480). These were great educational accomplishments for many Iranian youths as a
result of the shah‟s modernization in the area of education.
As a result of these educational accomplishments however, many young and
newly educated Iranians, whether educated domestically or abroad, desired to seek out a
career in Iran after graduating. Many had heightened expectations due to their higher
levels of education to that of previous generations of Iranians.
This section analyzed the rapid modernization policies of the shah in a traditional
society and the involvement and influence of the West, particularly the United States.
Samuel Huntington stated the following regarding the modernization of a traditional
society;
“The contrast between modern man and traditional man is the source of
the contrast between modern society and traditional society. Traditional
man is passive and acquiescent; he expects continuity in nature and
society and does not believe in the capacity of man to change or to control
either. Modern man, in contrast, believes in both the possibility and the
desirability of change, and has confidence in the ability of man to control
change so as to accomplish his purposes” (Huntington 1971, 287).
The shah wanted change and therefore forced the traditional people in Iran to change
their basic psychological foundation by modernizing, and modernizing quickly. From
1960 to 1978, Iran had the highest rate of growth among industrialized and developing
countries in terms of Gross National Product (GNP), averaging 7.9 percent annually
(Charle 1983, 125). The shah accomplished this by using oil revenues derived from
foreign, mainly Western countries. Iran‟s economy had become partially dependent on
oil revenues from the West. Iran‟s trade deficit was only $5 million in 1962, but Iran‟s
non-oil trade deficit was approximately $438 million (Commercial Statistics 1966, 32).
The shah, with the full support of the U.S, even at its bequest, then implemented

68

modernizing reforms that caused Iran to become completely reliant on the West. Scholar
David Apter suggested that enlarging choice is central to development, which requires
restricted access to it in the short run in order to generate surpluses, discipline, and
planning (Apter 1987, 17). The shah failed to do this and in fact did exactly the opposite.
Traditional Groups of Iran, Urbanization, and Social Mobilization
The two key aspects of modernization are economic development and social
mobilization. The previous section detailed the extent of economic development that had
taken place in Iran during the period of this study. This section will detail the social
mobilization that resulted from the Western oriented, modernizing policies of the shah.
Scholar Karl Deutsch defines social mobilization as, “the process in which major clusters
of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people
become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior” (Deutsch 1961, 494).
According to scholar Samuel Huntington, social mobilization is largely the result of
literacy, education, and urbanization (Huntington 1968, 34). As demonstrated in the
previous section, the shah was committed to improving literacy and westernizing the
educational system in Iran. These modernizing goals were largely accomplished. Once
the shah‟s land reforms were implemented he unknowingly created a condition that led to
urbanization. This section will detail this condition and analyze the affect it had on the
traditional groups in Iran.
The shah‟s land reform, while intended to improve the lives of peasants,
effectively replaced the landlords and inserted the state in its place. This resulted in a
break of the communal bond between the landed gentry and the peasants and it failed to
improve the wealth of the peasantry.
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“Ali Dasagir received his 20-acre plot under a land-reform program
decreed by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi 15 years ago. Since then, Mr.
Dasagir‟s three sons have moved to the factories of Teheran, and though
the capital is only 50 miles east, their father rarely sees them. With no one
to tend the corn and cauliflower fields and the herds of goats and sheep as
he grows older, the 62-year old Mr. Dasagir is thinking of selling his
holdings to real estate developers. “I never wanted to move to this city but
it has moved here,” he said. “It is all around me.” He was speaking
literally. The compound of mud-walled houses that Mr. Dasagir and his
older neighbors inhabit has been preserved like a shrine from a bygone
era. Around them, Nazarabad has emerged as a community of 15,000
people, with asphalted streets, brick homes bristling with television
antennas, small factories and modern stores” (Kandell 1978a, A11).
Though the landlords often shared only one-fifth of the profits with the peasants, the
landed gentry and the traditional community within the village provided an apparatus for
subsistence, whereas the government did not.

The shah became so focused on

modernizing Iran in the Western image he was oblivious to the break in traditional
associations his reforms were causing. These policies by the shah led to a duel economy
in Iran.
In the shah‟s effort to modernize Iran, creating a newly modernized workforce
was one of his first goals. In order to accomplish this he created more professional,
technical, and clerical jobs in an effort to transform the economy. The shah had no plan
for incorporating the traditional elements into this newly modernized workforce that he
had created. A former Cabinet Minister of the shah‟s stated the following;
“Looking back…if we should have done one thing differently, it would
have been to strike a balance between urban industry and agriculture. We
distributed land but we did not do enough to keep people in the
countryside. It would have made this country more stable” (Kandell
1978a, A11).
The reforms of the “White Revolution” essentially signaled a change in power from the
old landed gentry to the new modern middle class.
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The growth in government

bureaucracy increased demands by the public and private sectors for technicians and
managers, rapid expansion of a Western style educational system that resulted from the
rise of a new middle class. As the shah continued in his effort to modernize the economy
in Iran, he simultaneously neglected the most traditional elements in his society and a
duel economy developed. The shah attempted to change the economy from a primarily
agricultural and service society to an industrialized service economy.
Farming best demonstrates the shah‟s neglect of the agrarian sector of the Iranian
economy, while his modernization efforts were rapidly expanding elsewhere. In Iran,
only about 5 percent of the land was under cultivation in 1978, and less than half of the
farmlands were irrigated (Kandell 1978a, A11). The dominant agrarian sector of the
Iranian economy began to stagnate due to the mass exodus that occurred with the shift to
the urban sector.
“Demographically, modernization means changes in the patterns of life, a
marked increase in health and life expectancy, increased occupational,
vertical, and geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of
urban population as contrasted with rural” (Huntington 1968, 33).
Iranians were leaving the rural areas due to the shift in economic prioritization by the
Iranian government, which translated to perceived increases in urban employment
opportunities. The modernization in mass communications allowed for this information
to become more widely disseminated as well. In 1966, the Iranian census did not
mention ownership of radios, by the 1970s, over 65 percent of households owned radios,
and in the urban areas it was more than 75 percent (Milani 1994, 66). This media access
that most Iranians now had in the comforts of their own homes gave them new ideas
about their future, which previously they did not have.
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As migration from the rural areas to the industrialized areas of Iran occurred,
coupled with the failure of the government to offer any economic incentive to stay, many
of these former agrarian workers became disconnected from the newly industrialized
economy. They essentially became marginalized by the rapid modernizing policies of the
shah‟s government.

Scholar David Apter stated the following regarding the term

marginal, in the context of development;
“Marginal here does not only mean unemployed. It refers to a “pariah”
subculture whose members are regarded as basically “unemployable,”
which can include a very diverse population: urban squatters, “lumpens,”
and many others living at the fringes of the productive system. Forming
distinctive subcultures, “functionally superfluous” in terms of their
contributions to a development output, they live under conditions of high
uncertainty, great personal risk, and with few prospects for regular work”
(Apter 1987, 18).
These were the conditions in which the shah‟s modernizing policies relegated the rural
workers; living in the urban areas to which many had never previously ventured and with
few if any transferable skills for employment. Scholar Edward Shils stated the following;
“substantive traditions are more endangered by the disorder of urban idleness and the
supplantation of local and tribal authorities than they are by the fragmentary and
unsuccessful authority of a remote and spuriously rationalized bureaucracy” (Shils 1981,
298). For the traditional groups of Iran, they had all three of these factors working
against them.
Another traditional group dealing with the duel economy created by the shah‟s
policies was the bazaaris. This is best illustrated by the newly created middle class that
began cutting into the bazaaris wholesale trade. The new middle class accomplished this
by establishing their own retail chains and outlets.

“The bazaar merchants seemed

relegated to secondary status by a government which emphasized the industrial and the
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“modern” sector of the economy” (Bakhash 1990, 191). This growth of independent
professionals, civil servants, white collar employees, and technicians was not welcomed
by the bazaaris.
The bazaaris were a powerful force throughout traditional society in Iran. The
propertied bazaaris were divided into two distinct layers; the upper, compromised of
whole sellers, commission agents, brokers, middle men, money-changers and work shop
owners; and the lower consisted of shopkeepers, artisans, and craftsmen (Hiro 1985, 61).
The bazaar is the area where they conduct their merchant business. The bazaar is a
tightly knit and hierarchical society, held together by a complete system of guilds and
trade networks (Afshar 1985, 7). Historically, the bazaar dealt with three-quarters of
whole sale trade and two-thirds of retail (Hiro 1985, 61). The bazaaris are divided up
within the bazaar according to their particular trade and some of the streets are named
after gold, shoe, and fabric sellers” (Sciolino 2000, 328). The bazaar is a densely built
community center that also includes; a maze of mosques, public bath houses, religious
schools, teahouses, unlit alleys, and backrooms that often serve as meeting places and
centers of communication (Sciolino 2000, 328). The bazaar itself was built at an angle
on the street grid so that it could face Mecca (Sciolino 2000, 328). The bazaar is
therefore not a place that caters to tourists as one may think. Scholar Edward Shils states
that tradition can include “buildings, monuments, and landscapes,” among other things
(Shils 1981, 12). It is easy to understand how the bazaar was an important cultural,
economic, and religious center for Iran‟s traditional society.
The fact that the bazaar was a cultural, economic, and religious center was an
important fact that allowed for crosscutting segments of Iranian society to converse.
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“In the traditional economy the bazaar was more than a market place; it
was the granary, the workshop, the bank, and the religious center for the
whole society. It was there that landowners sold their crops, craftsman
manufactured their wares, traders marketed their goods, those in need of
money raised loans, and it was there that businessmen built and financed
mosques and schools” (Abrahamian 1968, 128).
The bazaar was an organizational tool that made it possible for various groups to
collaborate with one another. The most important relationship of any two groups was
that of the bazaaris and the ulama. The ulama were comprised primarily of the Shiite
Muslims in Iran.

The bazaaris were largely religious conservatives themselves.

Intermarriage between the bazaaris and the ulama was fairly common and contributed to
the close relationship between the two groups (Omid 1994, 10). Another reason that the
ulama always viewed the bazaaris in a positive light was the fact that Mohammed himself
was a merchant. This is also why Muslims in general hold merchants in high esteem.
This economic, cultural, and historical relationship formed an important connectedness in
Iran‟s traditional society.
The modernizing policies of the shah not only threaten the livelihoods of the
bazaaris, but it also threatened their culture and historical roots as well. In the shah‟s new
Iran, “traditional merchants occupied a smaller place in the economy under the
modernizing Pahlavis” (Keddie 1995, 67). The bazaaris concerns regarding the shah‟s
modernizing economy were well founded, in 1956, there were 200,000 professional,
technical, and clerical workers in Iran, and by 1976, there were almost 1 million, twothirds of which worked for the state (Behdad and Rahnema 1995, 32). The bazaaris, as a
result of the shah‟s economic policies felt less represented by the government. Scholar
Edward Shils stated the following regarding the growth of government sector jobs in a
changing society;
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“The growth in the power of the civil service is one of the most striking
developments of the modern state in the present century. More than half a
century ago leading students of modern society warned against the
increasing power of the civil service and the dangers of rigidity and
inadaptiveness to the exigencies thrown up by the changing environment
of society and new tasks within the society” (Shils 1981, 191).
The bazaaris, a historical component of Iran‟s economy, society, and culture were being
swept aside by the government in favor of modernization. “The Pahlavis felt they could
ride rough-shod over “old fashioned groups” like the ulama, the nomads, and the
bazaaris, and rulers could believe this because of support by the USA and by oil money”
(Keddie 1995, 67).
The two dueling societies in Iran, modern and traditional, had been living in
different conceptual worlds under the shah‟s rapidly modernizing economy. They soon
began to live physically apart as well.
“The emergence of urban dualism – of a complete sociological division
within the old residential quarters had included families of all ranks. This
ensured social contact between different classes: the rich were in daily
contact with the ordinary, the poor and even the beggars. But all this
began to change when the wealth led, in the case of Tehran to an entirely
unplanned movement towards the northern parts of the city, into new
houses” (Segar 1986, 211).
Historically, in Iran, the agrarian upper class, peasants, merchant middle class, and
bourgeoisie all associated and lived around each other. It was not until the shah created
his new middle class of government workers and technicians that there was a divide and
certain classes did not associate with one another.
Another of the shah‟s modernizing goals was employing the indigenous industrial
bourgeoisie. Looking at the change in the labor force in Iran over a ten year period tells
the story. In 1966, 47.5 percent of the labor force was agriculturally based, 26.5 percent
was industrially based, and 26 percent was service based (National census of population
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and housing, November 1976, 1981). By 1976, the agricultural labor force decreased to
34 percent, the industrial force increased to 35.4 percent and the service labor force
increased to 30.6 percent (National census of population and housing, November 1976,
1981). In a fifteen year period stretching from 1963 to 1978, Iranians living in rural areas
dropped from 75 to 52 percent, and only one-third of the labor force was working in the
countryside (Kandell 1978a, A11). Wages in the urban sector averaged six times the pay
in rural areas (Kandell 1978a, A11). The two groups were put at odds by the Iranian
government.

They inhabited different worlds, one based on the newly modernized

industrial sector and the other based on the old agrarian model.
Another effect of this urbanization was that it led to an increase in food
consumption by Iranians.

In the mid-1970s, consumption was increasing at

approximately 22 percent, whereas production was only increasing at a rate of 7 percent
(Pace 1975b, 2). In 1956, only 31 percent of the population lived in the cities, in 1975, it
was estimated to be over 40 percent (Pace 1975b, 2). “With urbanization has come the
tendency to eat more and better food” (Pace 1975b, 2). The Iranian government had
either not conceived of this happening or just failed to plan for it.
Since farming production was unable to keep up with the increased rate of
consumption, Iran was now reliant on the importation of food. At the increased rate of
consumption in 1975, Iran would need to import 20 percent of its food by 1990, enough
to feed 10 million people (Pace 1975b, 2). Prior to the early 1960s, Iran had virtually no
reliance on food imports, by 1978, the modernizing country of Iran it became heavily
reliant on other countries‟ food.
“Ten years ago (1968), Iran was an exporter of grain, rice, and sugar.
Although production has risen since then, it has lagged far behind the
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population growth and the higher levels of consumption. Today, the
country produces less than 80 percent of the wheat it needs and only about
half the rice” (Kandell 1978a, A11).
Iran had now become reliant on oil revenues from the West to pay for enough food
imports to feed their newly modernized society. The shah had managed to create a
situation where the survival of a rapidly modernized and urbanized economy was
completely dependent on foreign assistance.
The traditional elements of Iranian society continued to be troubled regarding the
economic alliance Iran maintained with the United States. As an example, even while the
Iranian economy was expanding, many Iranian citizens complained that foreigners were
being paid higher salaries for the same work being performed (Clarity 1974b, 12).
Samuel Huntington stated the following in this respect;
“In a traditional society this inequality is accepted as part of the natural
pattern of life. Social mobilization, however, increases awareness of the
inequality and presumably resentment of it” (Huntington 1968, 57).
Iranians seemingly became resentful and began to see the influx of U.S. capital as the
westernization or “westoxication” of Iran.

This term “westoxication” came from a

famous essay written by Jalal Ale Ahmad, in which it is suggested that Iranians should
look to their oriental ways (Keddie 1995, 109).

Traditional groups saw this

“westoxication” manifest itself most prominently in three areas; the educational system
that was traditionally based out of the mosques, the United States-Iranian arms deals, and
the oil agreements between Iran and the West. Scholar Edward Shils stated the following
regarding schools in traditional societies exposed to modernization;
“If the schools become separated from religion and family and work
against them, traditions will not be transmitted; they will become very
attenuated. The tradition seeking capacities will be left without the
framework which they need” (Shils 1981, 315).
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Traditional groups in Iran became resentful of the shah‟s Western modernizing
government and the West in general. The message being communicated to the traditional
groups was that Western modernization was better. The affect it had on these groups was
resentment and perhaps a renewed sense of pride in their traditional practices.
Traditional groups in Iran did not experience the benefits of Western modernization as
perceived by the shah‟s government, only its severe drawbacks.
Political Institutionalization and Participation
After the coup of 1953, the shah had the opportunity to modernize political
institutions as he began modernizing the economy, thereby increasing opportunities for
political participation. Samuel Huntington stated that, “the level of institutionalization of
any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and
coherence of its organizations and procedures” (Huntington 1968, 12). The shah publicly
stated in 1963, his desire to play a lesser role in a more diffused Iranian government.
“Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi said today the reforms he was making in
Iran would bring democracy like that of the West and social advancement
to his people. “Some day the Shah of Iran may be able to assume the
same role in political affairs as do most European monarchs,” he said. By
that he meant a secondary role. But he said that Iran had not reached that
stage of advancement. He pleaded for more understanding of the
“disciplines” that may be required” (Walz 1963c, 6).
The shah certainly understood that the economic development in Iran would eventually
need to be accompanied by political development in addition. Scholar David Apter
defines political development as “regimes, state systems, and political systems whose
institutional functions, evolve along with developmental equity,” requiring “greater
participation and elite accountability” (Apter 1987, 18).
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This section will analyze

whether the shah‟s government became adaptable and highly institutionalized or less
adaptive, rigid, and less institutionalized.
As articulated in the previous section, Iranians began leaving the rural areas for
the urban sector as economic prioritization of the government began to change. These
rural workers, now living in the urban areas, isolated and detached from their former
communal enclaves and looking for work, had no way to express their grievances. “More
and more frequently it is the marginalized groups, especially those dispossessed of their
lands and displaced from their communities, who form into semi organized groups and
press demands on governments under circumstances, economic and political, that the
latter are unwilling or unable to satisfy” (Apter 1987, 33). In similar fashion, as the
urban areas grew around the bazaar, the bazaaris lacked any mechanism that would allow
for their concerns to be addressed regarding the new Western style businesses cutting into
their profits. Finally, the ulama were unable to voice their frustrations with respect to the
modernizing policies of the “White Revolution,” other than taking to the streets. Even
riots in the streets had been largely silenced since the uprisings in the early 1960s. The
shah tightened his control to the extent that there was not a “public squeak of dissidence”
(Clarity 1974a, 65).
Iranian students were another group that the shah was particularly interested in
silencing. The shah was largely able to silence the students in Iran, at least initially.
Students living abroad, however, vehemently protested and demonstrated against the shah
(Clarity 1974a, 65). Even these students were not completely safe. The shah openly
admitted that he had Iranian government officials in foreign countries conducting
surveillance on Iranian students‟ overseas (Shah, on Israel, Corruption, Torture and…

79

1976, 22). This failure to allow Iranians to express their feelings about changes and
issues in their communities created an atmosphere of frustration and resentment against
the shah and his government.
“The degree of community in a complex society…in a rough sense,
depends on the strength and scope of its political institutions. The
institutions are the behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and
mutual interest. The isolated family, clan, tribe, or village may achieve
community with relatively little conscious effort. They are, in a sense,
natural communities. As societies become larger in membership, more
complicated in structure, and more diverse in activities, the achievement
or maintenance of a high level of community becomes increasingly
dependent upon political institutions” (Huntington 1968, 10).
When the shah chose not to modernize political institutions and allow for at least some
limited political participation, after his policies dramatically changed the lives of so many
Iranians, the shah‟s monarchy effectively became an aristocracy.
The newly formed middle class of professional, technical, and clerical worker
jobs that the shah created in an effort to transform the economy was another group that
pushed for participation.

“Segments of the new class of experts, technicians, and

educated middle class refused to be mere functionaries of the state plans, and instead they
pushed for political participation” (Vahabzadeh 2010, 232). The shah thought that the
new middle class would be content with their modernized careers and way of life in Iran.
It never occurred to the shah that this newly created group with increased levels of
education would also have increasing levels of aspirations regarding political
involvement and participation.
The shah, while modernizing the economy, failed to modernize institutions for
interest articulation in any way. In fact, the shah immediately began moving in the
opposite direction to consolidate his power. In 1955, he began by removing the Prime
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Minister, General Fazlollah Zahedi, after he restored the oil industry in Iran. Zahedi was
replaced by an aid to the shah, Hussein Ala. The appointment of Hussein Ala, as his
successor, increased the political power of the shah (Love 1955, 4).
The shah also began to consolidate his power regarding the Majlis. The shah
effectively reduced the Majlis to a “rubber-stamp institution” (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani 1994,
56). The shah started by signing a decree ordering an amendment to the constitution to
increase the number of deputies in the lower house from 136 to about 300 and to increase
their terms from two to five years (Iran to Amend Laws 1957, 3). The shah then began to
fill the new seats in the Majlis with those friendly to his regime. “The shah is empowered
to name the Premier and through him the Cabinet,” additionally, the “local candidates for
Parliament are nominated by leaders of the two principal parties, which are submissive to
the shah‟s will” (Pace 1967, 18). The shah was able to maintain complete control within
the government as a result.
The shah‟s government was comprised of a two-party system. The Melliyun and
the Mardom were the only sanctioned parties legally allowed to exist. Both parties were
functionally powerless though. “By the mid-1960s, no legal opposition political party
remained (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani 1994, 55-56). The Communist Party in Iran, the Tudeh
Party, was outlawed and many party officers were purged under the shah‟s regime
(Iranian Red Doomed 1955, 6). The National Front Party of former Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadegh was also outlawed.
By 1975, the shah became even more autocratic and consolidated the two-party
system into just one party, the Rastakhiz or National Resurgence Party.

After the

establishment of the Rastakhiz, the state began a new crusade against traditional groups.
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The shah‟s government, now already involved in education, inserted themselves into
religious education as well. This began with the development of the Religious Corps.
The shah‟s government, through the Religious Corps, co-opted and utilized the mass
media (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1994, 81). The state thus attempted to censor or control
the religious message transmitted through the media. The bazaaris were negatively
affected by the establishment of the Rastakhiz as well. “Branches of the party were
opened up in the bazaar and forced donations from small businesses” (SrebernyMohammadi 1994, 82). The bazaaris, forced to compete with Western businesses due to
the shah‟s modernizing policies, were now required to donate to the government‟s only
political party. A political party and government that failed to represent their interests.
With the change from a two-party to a one-party system, the shah effectively was
limiting the average Iranians ability to seek redress for any grievances they might have.
The shah was restricting choice. Not that the two-party system in Iran offered much
choice either, it now became official with only one party able to legally operate. Scholar
David Apter defined the term development as referring to expanding choice and choice
referring to the range of articulated alternatives available to individuals and collectivities
(Apter 16). Apter stated that increasing choice has always been the central development
goal and “how to control access to choice and promote the sharing of it according to
approved rules and conditions of equality has been the special political concern of
development” (Apter 1987, 16). The shah failed to offer Iranians any choice when it
came to airing their grievances or becoming actively involved in the changes taking place
in Iran.
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Another area that the shah effectively limited institutional development was
regarding the establishment of unions. There was few trade or labor unions in Iran. The
formation of a union and the bargaining procedures established were sanctioned by the
Ministry of Labor (Hunt 1960a, 5). The Minister of Labor was of course appointed by
the shah and could be removed at any time. “The state-run trade unions merely extended
the control of the state to the workplace” (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani 1994, 56). Workers of
Iran were thus unable to find any solace from the few unions that were legally permitted
to exist.
The press was another institution that the shah also maintained almost complete
control over. The press is controlled and criticism of the shah is forbidden (Reforms in
Iran Bring New Hope 1970, 9). During times of restlessness in Iran, newspapers would
often not report incidents or downplay them according to government direction. In one
incident, journalists representing Time magazine were jailed for five days due to a
“suggestion” sent to the home office of the publication outlining a possible article on
candidates for the Majlis being “hand-picked” by the regime (Walz 1961, 20). The shah
also wanted to control religious publications produced in Iran as he increasingly viewed
the clergy as a threat to his regime. As a result of this perceived threat, in 1974, the shah
had all publishing houses that produced religious books closed down (Mackey and
Harrop 1996, 267).
The shah maintained his ruling aristocracy through a three pronged powerbase
that included; the United States, the Iranian military, and the police and the internal
security service, Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK). The U.S. and the
Iranian military made the shah feel secure and had Iranians believe, for awhile at least,
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that the shah was an immovable force. The police controlled the disorder in the streets
and the SAVAK dealt with particular individuals or groups deemed to be in opposition to
the government. The shah used top military men who supported him early on to take the
leadership roles in forming the SAVAK. The shah also established the Imperial Iranian
Inspectorate, tasked with watching the SAVAK, a further sign of the aristocracy that the
shah had constructed.
The shah built the SAVAK security organization in order that it would disallow
any challenge to his monarchy such as the situation in 1953, where he was forced to flee
the country for three days.
“After the Mossaddeq experience the shah decided he wanted an effective
internal security service and set up the large organization known by the
acronym SAVAK in 1957. Aid to SAVAK from American CIA and the
Israeli Mossad assured some efficiency, but added to feelings against the
countries that helped train SAVAK. With jail, torture, or even death as the
possible stakes, it is not surprising that even underground or exile
oppositional groups were decimated and suspicious or that within Iran
people were increasingly hesitant to discuss politics at all” (Keddie and
Yann 2003, 134).
Individuals that decided to speak out regarding perceived injustices being committed and
were jailed or tortured by the SAVAK as a result, obviously harvested resentment for the
shah, his government, and the United States and Israel for their roles regarding the
SAVAK. A former agent of the SAVAK, Bahman Naderipour, alias Tehrani, later
admitted to torturing hundreds of people and killing dozens in sixteen years while
employed under the security service of the Iranian government (Kandell 1979, A2). This
is how the shah dealt with those who were perceived as an enemy or threat to the Iranian
state, the shah.
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The shah relied heavily on the SAVAK to deal with dissidents in Iran. Between
1973 and 1978 the shah‟s government spent $2,650 million on the SAVAK (Ghods 1989,
197). From 1971 to 1976, SAVAK, “acting under the orders of the shah, effectively
exerted its dominion over the Ministries of Culture and Art, Information, Science and
Higher Education, and the National Iranian Radio and Television Organization” (Zahedi
2000, 43). The SAVAK were the watchful eyes and ears of the aristocratic government
of the shah.
Under the shah‟s regime, political dissidents were either jailed as was the case for
Mohammad Mossadegh and his closest ministers in 1953, exiled like the Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1965, or executed like many others. According to scholar Nils Gilman, a
segment of modernists he termed “high modernists,” are distinguishable from other
modernists by their “ruthless willingness to apply unrestrained state force to achieve their
modernist dreams” (Gilman 2003a, 11). The shah seems to fall into this segment of
modernists.

In 1975, it was estimated that the shah‟s government was holding

approximately 40,000 political prisoners, though the shah stated that it was not more than
3,000 (Shah Denies Jailing 40,000 Dissidents 1975, 2). Dissent was obviously not
tolerated by the shah in his new Iran. There is little doubt that the shah believed that his
policies of development were the correct ones for his country. The shah believed that he
was doing the right thing for Iranians in an attempt to improve their standard of living.
When certain groups spoke out against his policies, he felt that they were wrong,
ungrateful, and should be dealt with harshly.

Modernization from above led to

disconnect between the shah and those of whom his policies were affecting.
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The shah had implemented a rapidly modernized development plan without the
input of the populace in Iran. The failure of the shah to provide institutions for Iranians
to address issues that arose in their everyday lives in the rapidly modernizing Iran led to
anger and frustration. When this anger and frustration manifested itself, the shah brutally
suppressed it by any means possible. Because the shah had effectively suppressed all
groups in society and in government, only the shah was left to be blamed for problems
that developed. When the shah ignored or failed to realize the isolation and despair his
policies continued to cause, many Iranians began to look for alternative leadership.
Political Instability
By 1975, the oil boom had brought mass migration to the capital city of Teheran.
Teheran‟s population increased by one million over a seven year period to four million
(Pace 1975c, 3). The population increase led to housing shortages, inflation, traffic
issues, and pollution. While these issues were taking place, the oil boom began to slow
down due to a sharp fall in demand for oil. Iranian oil production in 1975 fell by 9.3
percent for the year (Smith 1976, 33). As a result, in early 1976, the Iranian government
was forced to propose a deficit budget, citing the drop in demand for oil as the reason for
the $2.4 billion gap between expenditures and revenues (Smith 1976, 33). Despite the
drop in revenues, Iran continued to import goods and buy military weaponry. Iran
imported $12.8 billion in the fiscal period between March of 1976 and March of 1977
and had ordered $5.8 billion in weapons and training services since 1974 (Ibrahim 1977,
78). Iran‟s budget went from $290 million in 1963 to $1.9 billion in 1973 and in 1978
reached $8 billion (Amirahmadi 1988, 59).
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As a result of the continued spending, lower revenues from oil, and the ensuing
budget gap, the shah needed a way to generate additional revenues.

The Iranian

government‟s solution was a two pronged approach in an attempt to climb out of the
newly found deficit. The first solution the government had was to increase taxes on its
people. This policy of increased taxation resulted in a 71 percent rise in taxes or salaries
in 1976 and another 51 percent in 1977 (Zahedi 2000, 102). The shah had wastefully
spent the enormous oil revenues that Iran had previously generated over the years on
modernizing projects and now wanted Iranians to foot the deficit bill.

There were

modernizing projects traditional groups in Iran never asked for, benefitted from, or had
any say regarding their implementation.
The second solution the shah devised to solve the deficit problem was to employ
an anti-profiteering campaign as a way of fighting the increased prices that resulted from
inflation. It was also estimated by economists that living costs in Iran had soared by 25
percent in mid-1975 (Pace 1975a, 51). “The rate of increase of retail prices rose from 3.7
percent per annum to 15.5 percent in 1974” (Afshar 1985, 33). This anti-profiteering
campaign entailed government set price limits on items. The profit rate was set at 14
percent even though inflation according to the government‟s own numbers was double
that level (Parsa 63). The inflation rate in the mid-late 1970s was difficult know for
certain. According to some estimates, it had gone as high as 40 percent (Green 40).
Traditional merchants were now expected to comply with strict price limits being set by
the shah in a hyper inflationary period.

Economist Osvaldo Sunkel describes a

hyperinflationary period as one where “planning becomes impossible” and “extremely
sensitive to exogenous disturbances” (Sunkel 1993, 105).
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This was the economic

environment that the shah created and in which he expected traditional merchants to
survive.
In order to implement this anti-profiteering policy, the shah mobilized a special
task force headed by the minister of commerce, where approximately 10,000
“inspectors,” many of whom were students and housewives, monitored prices and
received cash bonuses for reporting “profiteers” (Gage 1978a, SM12).

During this

campaign, many businesses were temporarily closed, some merchants were jailed, and
others were initially sentenced to be deported to remote areas, though this latter penalty
was later rescinded (Gage 1978a, SM12). This anti-profiteering campaign was obviously
embarrassing and humiliating to the merchants. Resentment of the shah was to be
expected. This anti-profiteering campaign further added to the sharp economic decline
that many groups in Iran were feeling at the time.
When anti-shah demonstrations truly became organized in 1978, the oil workers
were one of the first groups to go on strike. “Not only did it destroy the image of the
shah‟s invincibility, it also paralyzed the economy, and sent a message abroad that the
shah could no longer be relied upon as a stable ally, who could deliver oil to the
international economy” (Afshar 1985, 99). This was the price the shah paid for trying to
build an economic power on oil sales alone.
In 1978, the oppositional movement to the shah became organized, centralized,
and violent.

The shah‟s rapid modernization policies and the economic conditions

created from those policies had taken their toll. By late 1978, the new middle class had
seen the shah discontinue many industrial plans, construction projects, limited wage
raises, and cancelled the customary annual bonuses to office employees and workers

88

(Hiro 1985, 73). A united multi-class alliance between the traditional groups and the new
modern middle class had formed, all in opposition to the shah and his policies. The shah
managed to aggravate, humiliate, and ultimately provoke and organize the industrialists
and the traditional groups into a revolutionary force. They were united in the feeling that
the shah had squandered the economic prosperity that they once enjoyed and was
incapable of turning things around. Striking teachers allowed students to protest, while
electrical and oil worker strikes effectively put the country‟s economy at a standstill.
One of the first principle demands of the strikers was that all foreigners in the oil
industry be expelled from Iran. In 1978, more than 40,000 Americans and 70,000 other
foreigners were working in Iran and feeling growing pressure to leave from striking
Iranians (Kandell 1978b, 1). Foreign workers were identified as being part of the shah‟s
failed modernization policies and thus this action by the strikes was a rebuke of the
shah‟s policies and Western intrusion.
In the second half of 1978, strikes were sporadic throughout Iran. Even when
workers went back to work as a result of pressure exerted by the shah‟s military force,
many workers engaged in “foot-dragging” while on the job. “Discontent among the
workers is said to be widespread and many are reported to be going to their jobs but
doing a minimum of work” (Gage 1978b, A1). The strikes and work slowdowns had a
detrimental effect on the economy of Iran in 1978. This effect was a calculated one by
the workers engaging in the strikes and slowdowns. The shah‟s rapidly modernized
country was completely reliant on the continued production of oil. The opposition was
well aware of this fact. The strikes were causing the shah to lose control of Iran, a
control that seemed unchallengeable, until late 1978.
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Besides the oil industry, another target of many strikers was the banking industry.
In November 1978, those already striking were successful in convincing workers of the
Central Bank in Teheran to go on strike (Ibrahim 1978, A7). The ensuing instability that
had spread to the banking system in Iran caused an exodus of currency to the United
States and Europe. Transfers from Iran to Zurich and London were estimated to total
around $2 billion and transfers to California around 3 billion (Kilborn 1978, 4). Much of
the money was believed to have belonged to the family of the shah, other government
officials, and businessmen who profited from the oil boom (Kilborn 1978, 4). The fact
that the shah and his family were moving much of their financial wealth overseas was
evidence of the extent of instability that had occurred in late 1978. It was also evidence
that the shah had a clear understanding of this instability. With each successful strike the
movement grew stronger and rioting became increasingly intense.
Many Iranians were not only rioting out of angry and frustration from the shah‟s
economic policies, but due to the fact that he never allowed them to voice their opinion
about any of these rapid modernizing policies. Consequently, rioters focused much of
their attention on the shah and his Restakhiz Party.
“The most savage attacks were against the Tabriz headquarters of the
Restakhiz, the three-year-old Iranian National Resurgence Party that is
Iran‟s only legal political force. Today the building of the “Shah‟s party”
here is gutted, its walls blackened by fire. It appears that the
demonstrators smashed every one of the blue-enameled emblems of Iran‟s
2,500th anniversary celebrations that are displayed at Government offices
all over the nation” (Hofmann 1978, 7).
Iranians were essentially voicing their feelings of dissent against the shah and his
policies. These were feelings that were deemed illegal by the government, and their
expression was denied during the shah‟s rule.
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Much of the rioting by the oppositional movement to the shah was made possible
by a new human rights policy being pushed by the Carter administration. In 1977,
President Jimmy Carter began a policy of denying United States assistance to any country
that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes. This new policy put added pressure on
the shah. In early 1977, the State Department, in its first detailed report on human rights
found that Iran had violated human rights (Gwertzman 1977, 1). The U.S. government in
the end decided to continue military support to Iran, despite the report, but the shah‟s
government was on notice to reform. The human rights policy came at a bad time for the
shah as the economic difficulties became increasingly severe and rioting became routine.
The Carter administration was not alone in their scrutiny of the shah‟s human rights
record.

The International Association of Jurists and Amnesty International both

publically criticized the shah‟s policies (Gage 1978c, 1).
As a result of the outside pressures placed on the shah regarding human rights, the
shah began a policy of liberalization of political dissidents. In mid-1977, a bill was
proposed and signed that guaranteed the rights of political dissidents (Howe 1977, 6).
The reform bill guaranteed the arraignment or release of a prisoner within twenty-four
hours after being brought before the prosecutor (Howe 1977, 6). By the end of 1977, the
shah continued to make concessions or in some cases to least look as if he were in an
effort to appease the United States, human rights organizations, and the growing domestic
discontent with him and his government.
“According to American officials, the Shah has moved quietly but
effectively in recent months to limit political arrests to cases involving
violence, to relax stiff restraints on the press and, apparently, to end the
use of torture. Private Iranian citizens who are not active in the opposition
said, however, that they have not noticed any such changes and that as far
as they can see, repression remains intense” (Lewis 1977, 4).
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The shah seemingly did too little too late. Though the shah did just enough to try and
please those demonstrating and rioting against his government, it was not enough.
The Carter administration continued to praise the shah‟s human rights efforts in
response to their increased demands. On a visit to Tehran, New Year‟s Eve 1977,
President Carter toasted Iran as an “island of stability” due to the shah‟s “leadership and
to the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you” (Safire 1980,
A23).

Less than a year later in early December 1978, President Carter stated that

“frankly, he didn‟t know if the Shah would survive” (Present Tense 1978, E1). At the
end of 1978, the shah released hundreds of political prisoners in a last ditch effort to
reconcile with his people (Present Tense 1978, E1). It had no effect in dissuading the
fervent demonstrations and rioting. Iranians had lost faith in the shah because of the
direction he had taken the country, and in his efforts to change course. The shah had
been in complete control of the economic decisions made in Iran and it was therefore
easy for Iranians to blame him for the economic downturn. They also felt he was out of
step with many of their cultural and traditional beliefs. As a result, on January 16, 1979,
the shah was forced to leave Iran for an “extended vacation.”
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This case study set out to demonstrate that rapid modernization generated as a
result of state enacted social mobilization and economic development coupled with the
suppression of political participation results in political instability.

This case study

additionally set out to demonstrate that this political phenomenon would be further
complicated if based on an exogenous model.
This case study started by looking at some of the leading comparative political
science scholars that specialized in the area of modernization and development in an
effort to gain insight and better articulate the political phenomenon that was the focus of
this study.

A brief historical analysis was conducted in an effort to get a better

understanding of Iran‟s past brushes with modernization and foreign intrusion. This
study demonstrated that the foreign intrusion of Iran was begun in the nineteenth century
by Britain and Russia. A few of the most notable incidents of modernization such as the
Reuter Concession, Tobacco Revolt, Constitutional Revolution, and the modernization
efforts of Reza Shah were analyzed.

This analysis demonstrated that these early

modernizing efforts were initiated from above by Iranian leadership and through Western
influence. This historical analysis also demonstrated how traditional groups in Iran
disapproved and fought back against these Western oriented modernization efforts. This
historical analysis was also done in an effort to contrast the modernization efforts in Iran
and the reaction by traditional groups prior to Mohammad Reza Shah.
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The primary case study aptly began with the United States and British led coup
against the Mossadegh government that put the shah in power. This study showed that
the coup was motivated out of ideological, strategic and economic reasons. The U.S. felt
that the Mossadegh government might be sympathetic towards the Soviet Union and was
displeased with the nationalization of Iranian oil. This study demonstrated that once in
power, the shah began exporting oil as expeditiously as possible and spent the huge oil
revenues on modernization projects. Due to the billions of dollars in additional revenue
through oil the shah was able to implement any and all modernization projects he desired.
Additionally, the shah was able to rapidly modernize his military by purchasing the latest
U.S. weaponry.
As part of the modernization effort of the shah, he implemented his “White
Revolution,” which changed many aspects of life for traditional Iranians. This study was
able to demonstrate that the land reforms, women‟s suffrage, and educational reforms all
ended up having a negative effect on traditional groups in Iran. Due to the negative
effects of the land reform and the focus the shah placed on the newly industrialized
economy, many workers in the traditionally dominant agrarian sector were forced to
migrate to the cities. This in turn created urbanization and social mobilization that
allowed for the coordination against the shah and his government.
This study was also able to show the increasingly autocratic manner in which the
shah ruled after the coup in 1953.

The shah did not allow for any political

institutionalization or political participation in Iran. As a result of these factors, coupled
with the oil bust that occurred in the mid-1970s, the shah‟s regime became unstable. As
the economy became worse, the shah continued to isolate himself through his policy
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decisions until even the new industrial class became disenchanted with him. The various
groups began to believe that the shah was incapable of fixing the economic mess that he
himself created. In addition, the traditional groups in Iran were equally troubled by the
amount of westernization or “westoxication” that had occurred under the shah. The result
was revolution. The traditional groups in Iran simply wanted someone who was more in
touch with their traditional ways. The charismatic cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, became
the embodiment of what the people desired.
Reflections, Lessons, and Future Policies
Reflecting on the results of this case study, the conclusion must be reached that
modernization theory‟s basic premise that all societies evolve in a similar fashion, is
false. Some of the tenets of modernization theory, namely that political participation is
required for development, have been proven accurate. Furthermore, it has been shown
that when developing countries are forced to modernize in a period of decades where
developed countries had centuries, the pace is an unnatural and destabilizing.
“The potential for major social and political instability is especially high
where “developmental crises” overlap instead of occurring sequentially in
time: basic land reform that breaks up the landed estates to the advantage
of a growing middle peasantry; the replacement of subsistence farming
with a market economy in agriculture; industrialization along with
urbanization; national integration of previously parochial subcultures or
relatively autonomous political regions; the secularization of the society
through the separation of church and state and a reduction in the social and
political roles of religion; political organization and integration of the
newly mobilized masses of the modernizing society” (Greene 1990, 166).
This economic change is a fundamental precondition for revolution that was not only
present in Iran, but pre-revolutionary France, China, Vietnam, Columbia, Kenya, the civil
war in Spain and others (Greene 1990, 164-166).
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The economic conditions that

developed in pre-revolutionary Iran can therefore be studied and applied when studying
other developing countries.
This case study has also demonstrated the need for a new approach to
development theory as well. Modernization theory is a conservative intellectual tradition
rooted in a West centered approach and dependency theory is heavily tied to communist
models. Both theoretical paradigms are constrained ideologically and have failed to lead
to a functional model for development as a result. The field of comparative politics
therefore continues to wrestle with the issue of modernization and development as the
global economy expands. This study therefore advocates for a more relativist approach.
“Relativism insists that human behavior and development can only be understood within
its proper context - there are no models or theoretical constructs that are universally
applicable” (Brohman 1995, 122).

A way forward may therefore be found in the

indigenization of development theory. This view is supported by Osvaldo Sunkel‟s
argument that underdeveloped countries possess distinctive features and as a result
should develop differently and independently. There is little question that the political
phenomenon of development will continue to be an important area of study in the field of
comparative politics as further progress is still needed.
One of the paramount lessons regarding the modernization efforts of Mohammad
Reza Shah is that traditional groups must be included in the decision making process.
Beyond offering political participation and institutions allowing groups to articulate their
interests, regimes must not become out of touch with the traditions and the traditional
groups within their society. Traditions transmitted from one generation to the next
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culminate into a culture that makes each society unique. Leaders that emulate other
cultures or forget their own, or both, are perhaps unsuited to lead their country.
The United States‟ failed foreign policy efforts in Iran through the use of the
modernization theory paradigm, proved tragic. The question of whether the United States
can play a constructive role in developing countries modernization is clear, as it largely
cannot. This study demonstrates that the interests of the U.S. often work against the
interests of developing countries. In fact, underdeveloped countries could likely become
more prosperous if they separated themselves from the global market and pursued a
course more in line with their traditional needs, and less dictated by external pressures.
“Demands for the indigenization of theories and strategies of development
flow from two interrelated concerns: first, that the Western models contain
too many false universals and Eurocentric biases to comprehend many
crucial issues and problems of the Third World development; and, second,
that development programmes and policies based on the Western models
have brought devastating results to most developing countries, particularly
to their poorest, most vulnerable and disadvantaged classes and social
groups” (Brohman 1995, 131).
The tragedy with respect to the Iran is that the country was attempting to pursue an
indigenous course under the Mossadegh government.

U.S. and British intervention

denied the Iranian people the opportunity to develop their economy on their own terms
and harness their own natural resources rather than exporting them. The intervention of
the U.S. and Britain led to an alternate path of development for Iran. This path had
disastrous consequences for traditional society. Also, it eventually had a disastrous
consequence for the United States and the West with the onset of the revolution and the
subsequent Islamic Republic that emerged.
The United States has built a reputation around the developing world.
Unfortunately, this reputation is largely based on a foreign policy of intrusion. U.S.
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interventionist policies in Iran have demonstrated the disastrous consequences that often
result. “At a time when the Third World looms increasingly large on the international
political horizon, the United States must learn to develop new relationships based on trust
and mutual respect with the peoples and classes that will direct these developing societies
in the years ahead” (Bill 1988, 447-448). Future U.S. policies towards developing
nations may therefore be best served by being strictly covert and advisory in nature only.
This could help to ensure that foreign regimes maintain a more authentic and inclusive
approach towards the more traditional indigenous groups within their society and the U.S.
could build a new reputation in the developing world.
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